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ABSTRACT 
 
People migrate for a variety of reasons. Some choose to migrate and others are forced. To cross 
an international border, they need permission of the host state. The 1951 Refugee Convention 
creates the refugee as an exceptional category of international migrants that is entitled to 
international protection. This research seeks to explore whether international refugee law 
rationally protects vulnerable peoples in the contemporary world. This is done through 
examining the historical context through which the refugee was created as a legal subject in 
international law and evaluating the critiques of the current implementation of international 
refugee law. This thesis argues that the causes of migration from countries of the global south are 
linked with global inequalities of power and wealth, a condition that the human rights and 
humanitarian language of the international refugee regime fails to address. 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper begins with the idea that international refugee law is unhelpful in addressing 
displacement and migration in contemporary society. International refugee law developed as a 
reaction to massive displacement at the onset of the twentieth century, as empires were 
dissolving and new ideological regimes were developing, and when nations were forming and 
borders were being drawn. The laws and norms that developed in this period were effective for 
most of the twentieth century, but they only addressed the issue of displacement of Europe.  
Currently refugees and asylum seekers represent only 10.5 million1 of approximately 214 
million international migrants.2
…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country.
 Migration occurs as a result of various reasons including socio-
economic conditions (poverty, unemployment, etc.), development projects, environmental 
disasters and degradation, generalized violence, and conflict, among others. Although there are a 
variety of reasons that compel a person to migrate, either voluntarily or by force, since 1951 the 
refugee has been categorized as an exceptional group of international migrants that is entitled to 
international protection. This exceptional group of international migrants are persons who are 
outside their country and, 
3
 
 
This definition is found in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and reflects 
the perceptions of its time with regard to political priorities and causes of forced migration. 
Although sixty years have passed and the geopolitics and nature of forced migration have 
changed significantly, the above definition is still largely used to determine which migrants fall 
into the exceptional category of refugeehood, and thus deserving of international protection. 
                                                             
1 This includes 597,300 persons UNHCR considers to be in ‘refugee-like’ situations, and does not include 
the some 4.8 million Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations Works and Relief 
Agency. See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, 10th ed. (UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, December 27, 2011), 6, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f06ecf72.html 
(accessed March 2, 2012). 
2 International Organization for Migration, “Global Estimate and Trends,” IOM, 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en (accessed January, 4 2012). 
3 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations Treaty Series, 
189 (July 29, 1951): 137,http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html (accessed December 20, 2011).  
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Unlike the refugees of the past, today’s refugee are no longer white, European, or ideologically 
significant.4 In fact the vast majority of refugees and asylum-seekers, are produced from some of 
the poorest countries in the world, from what will be referred to as the global south.5
This paper will utilize dichotomies as a tool to draw on the differential treatment of 
refugees and other migrants, specifically through the use of the terms ‘global north’ and ‘global 
south.’ Such terms can be problematic as they create ridged geographic distinctions and imply 
that regions or peoples are homogeneous. In contemporary discourse, the dichotomies of global 
north and south have generally replaced the earlier terminology of West and East, or First and 
Third Worlds, but contemporary terminology carries with it the same problems. The global 
south refers to certain parts of the world that have been left behind in terms socio-economic 
development and success
 
6 and connotes images of “squalor, corruption, violence, calamities and 
disasters, irrational local fundamentalisms, bad smell, garbage, filth, technological 
'backwardness' or simply lack of modernity.”7 The danger in using these dichotomies is that they 
create broad generalizations which fail to reflect the diversity of persons, societies and cultures 
in both the global north and south, as well as the economic prosperity of some people in the 
south and the impoverishment of some in the north.8 What many states in the south do share is a 
common history and experience of colonialism and oppression by the north, which has shaped 
their political consciousness as well as placed them in a certain narrative that has been created 
and perpetuated by the north.9
                                                             
4 B.S. Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South,” Journal of Refugee Studies 
11, no. 4 (1998): 351. 
 The danger in using these distinctions is that it further validates 
them and entrenches these false generalizations. While aware of this issue, dichotomies can also 
be a useful and strategic tool for challenging and re-shaping current understandings. For this 
thesis, the use of the global north and south can be useful because the 1951 Convention was 
created in a time when such dichotomies, as well as the East-West Cold War dichotomy, were 
influential in law making. As Steinbeck notes, the 1951 Convention is “both a product and a part 
5 See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010.  
6  Usha Natarajan, “The 2003 Iraq Invasion and the Nature of International Law” (PhD diss., Australian 
National University, 2008), 57-58. 
7 BalakrishnanRajagopal, “Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography,” Third World Legal Studies 
15, no.1 (1998-99):2. 
8 In terms of GDP, global south countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and Korea are listed among the top 
twenty countries. See The World Bank, “GDP Ranking 2010,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/GDP-ranking-table(accessed May 1, 2012). 
9 Natarajan, “The 2003 IraqInvasion and the Nature of International Law,” 57-58. 
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of history of the twentieth century.”10
Moving into the twenty first century, international refugee law has been challenged on all 
fronts. For some governments, international refugee law prevents them from controlling (and 
restricting) entry into their countries. As Dauvergne argues, “in the present era of globalization, 
control over the movement of people has become the last bastion of sovereignty;”
 Utilizing this dichotomy as a literary tool is important for 
this thesis as it enables addressing the divided understanding of the world in which these laws 
were created, and the divide that has been perpetuated through their use. 
11
This paper will argue that international refugee law was formulated in a specific 
historical moment and time that is no longer relevant to the causes of migration and the changing 
demographic of the persons in need of protection, effectively making the current legal subject of 
the refugee an irrational exception in the larger context of migration. In utilizing this outdated 
and problematic distinction, the refugee regime
 the desire to 
maintain control over who can and cannot enter the territory of the state has been met with 
restrictive border polices, often times at the detriment of refugee protection. On the other hand, 
many refugee organizations and advocates believe that the definition of a refugee, as someone 
entitled to international legal protection, is far too narrow to fit with the contemporary realities of 
migration and those in need of international protection.  
12
As Legoux notes, “what tends to render the asylum law…ineffectual for the people of 
poor countries is the result of a particular conception of asylum, one with a long and complex 
history, and one which is becoming ever more stringent.”
 has created a system which utilizes the 
discourse of human rights and humanitarianism to exacerbate and further widen to socio-
economic divide between the global north and south, maintaining, and even strengthening, the 
current international power dynamic, as well as compromising the real value of the protection 
that is currently offered. 
13
                                                             
10 Daniel J.Steinbock, “The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Interpretation,” in RefugeeRights and 
Realities, ed. Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (WestNyack, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19. 
  Utilizing this idea, Part I will trace 
the historical roots of international refugee law and its evolution into the current refugee regime, 
11 Catherine Dauvergne, “Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times,” The Modern Law Review 67, 
no. 4 (July 2004): 1. 
12 The ‘refugee regime’ will be used to refer to the international, regional and domestic refugee laws and 
policies, UNHCR, and the various international and domestic assistance and aid refugee organizations. 
13 Luc Legoux, quoted in Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Taylor & 
Francis. 2005): 13. Originally this quote was specific to asylum procedures in France, however I believe that the 
main point of the statement is true for asylum procedures in the global north. 
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with attention to how the definition of a refugee was created, and a specific focus on who it was 
created for. Beginning in the formation of sovereign states and the ideals associated with 
sovereignty, the protections and rights that refugee law articulates are contextualized in a certain 
type of legal framework and individual-state relationship. Moving through the formation of the 
refugee definition and protection in World War I and II, and ending with the Cold War, one can 
see the way the definition was shaped by a certain kind of European displacement, as well as the 
political agenda of the time period. Through this progression it is evident that the legal subject of 
the ‘refugee’ was created in international law under exceptional circumstances of global war, and 
certain conditions of displacement.  
Since the 1951 Convention was created, there has been an outflow of criticism and 
suggested reforms. Part II of the paper will discuss the major critiques and recommended 
reforms of international refugee law and the protection regime. Much of the current critique 
focuses on the restrictive measures and procedures for asylum in the global north, which is 
important to understanding the global north’s desire to limit the entry of asylum-seekers (and 
more generally, international migrants) from the global south. This in turn sheds light on the 
problematic role the wealthier countries in the global north play in regulating (and largely 
controlling) global refugee protection. 
Finally, Part III will engage with the reality of migration in the global south, which often 
falls outside of the purview of international refugee law. The global geopolitical shift since the 
end of the Cold War and the process of globalization has challenged international refugee law. 
The causes of migration – whether forced or voluntary – are becoming increasingly related to the 
state of global inequality, making the current legal category of the ‘refugee’ largely irrelevant. 
As this reality has emerged, this section will also discuss the global north’s preference for 
regional refugee protection systems and the way in which the issue of refugees has been de-
politicized and relegated almost entirely to the realm of humanitarianism. The paper will 
conclude with what can be done to understand the contemporary realities of forced migration and 
move forward to a more realistic and relevant framework for protection. 
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PART I: THE CREATION OF THE REFUGEE 
 
Displacement is not a modern problem. Throughout history persons have moved (by 
force or by choice) due to war, famine, and other causes. However, human migration and 
movement has only become “categorized, politicized, qualified, quantified, studied and 
controlled with the growth of the contemporary nation-state.”14
Arguments have been made that refugee production today is rooted in the geo-political 
structure of the world, which is based on the idea of state sovereignty.
 The contemporary legal category 
of the refugee, and the regime that is charged with their protection, has been constructed 
predominately during the twentieth century, and especially influential has been the political and 
security agenda of the modern nation state.   
15 International refugee 
law and, more broadly, international law, have evolved with the modern state system reflecting 
changes and concerns in economics, ideologies, and balance of power.16
The Rise of Sovereignty and Sovereign Borders 
 In order to understand 
where international refugee law stands today, it is important not only to understand the history 
and development of refugee law and the refugee regime, but also the system of governance and 
political ideologies that it exists within a system built upon the foundational concept of state 
sovereignty.  
The notion of state sovereignty, as an international legal concept (and arguably the ‘ideal’ 
form of governance) was cemented in the Peace of Westphalia, which was signed in 1648.17 
Among other things,18
                                                             
14 Alison Mountz, “Migration,” in   Key Concepts in Political Geography, Carolyn Gallaher, et al., 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2009), 174. 
 this treaty brought forth a new form of governance in Europe based on a 
sovereign state. This system established a model in which all sovereign states were all 
15 Charles B. Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters,” 
International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 303-14. 
16Laure Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 
International Journal of Refugee Law 14, no. 2 (2002): 239.    
17 The Peace of Westphalia marked the official end of the Thirty-Years War, which took place from 1618-
1648. For more information, see Thomas H. Greer and Gavin Lewis, A Brief History of the Western World, 9th ed. 
(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 398-400. 
18 The Peace of Westphalia also established a principle of tolerance by instating equality between Protestant 
and Catholic states and providing some safeguards for religious minorities, as well as mechanisms for conflict 
resolution between European powers. See Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” The American 
Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (January 1948): 20-41; and Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 310. 
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theoretically equal in terms of international law and diplomacy.19 Although states in Europe were 
not equal in population, territorial size, or military power, they were all entitled to the ‘right to 
sovereignty.’20 Westphalia was intended to signify the end of imperialism in some senses,21 and 
the “abandonment of a hierarchal structure of society and [the] option for a new system 
characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory.”22 
It created a unified European political system and also led to the creation of international law.23
The conventional idea of a state’s sovereignty is narrowly conceived as “the power of a 
State to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory,” or “territorial 
supremacy.”
 
24 In order for this territory to gain meaning, there must be borders that separate 
sovereign powers or states from each other and within these borders there must be persons who 
hold a sort of membership to the nation, or citizenship. Borders, as lines and limits of 
sovereignty, also largely decide citizenship. States are bound by rules of membership, in which 
citizens belong and all others are aliens.25 In the legal sense, citizenship is a “formalized 
categorical designation,”26 which, in theory, creates a sort of social contract in which states are 
legally responsible for the citizens of their sovereign state.27
This model of the sovereign state, complete with territorial borders and notions of 
nationality or citizenship, gained its reinforcement as the norm and was the dominant model of 
political organization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The dissolution of empires after 
World War I, the realignment of powers after World War II, the process of decolonization, and 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, all brought about new sovereign states formed in the 
 Within this relationship of rights 
and obligations is implied a territorial component, in which all states care for their own citizens 
within the borders of the country.  
                                                             
19 Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia.” 
20 Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia,” 29. 
21 This of course does not refer to colonialism, which was seen as a project of modernization, as well as an 
extension of the sovereign. For a critical analysis of how the ‘civilizing mission’ of the project of colonialism 
interacts with this idea of extending the sovereign, see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law. 
22 Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia,” 28. 
23Ibid., 29.   
24Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1, Peace (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1905), 170. 
25 Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International Migration 
Review 30, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 1051. 
26 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means For Migration and Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121. 
27Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, “Migration Without Borders: An Investigation Into the Free 
Movement of People,” Global Migration Perspectives no. 27, UNESCO, (April 2005): 8-9. 
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Westphalian Model, where borders marked the territory and the limits of these new or reformed 
sovereigns. Arguably, the “assumption that countries ought to be organized as nation-states is the 
key to understanding the political basis of refugee production and of policies towards refugees 
developed in the twentieth century.”28
The international response to refugee flows that developed from the events of World 
Wars I and II were founded on the sovereign state system.
 Refugee protection is a surrogate protection provided by a 
sovereign state to a non-national when their own state fails to protect them. Thus, in the legal 
sense, without borders and sovereign states there can be no refugees.  
29 Uncontrolled movements of persons 
who would normally be under the protection of their state threaten political stability, and “if the 
movement is caused by people who lack their state's normal protection, then a serious failure of 
the state system has occurred.”30
International refugee law, as is exists today, entered the international system as 
international law, through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although the 
notion of a refugee, or rather people fleeing conflict or living in exile has existed throughout 
history,
  Understanding how the perceived failures of the First and 
Second World Wars led to the creation of international refugee law, and arguably created the 
refugee through defining it, helps explain the political motivations and limitations of the law as it 
operates today.  
31
The First and Second World Wars 
 as an international mechanism for protection, international refugee law is relatively 
new and was created during a specific moment in history. International Refugee Law represents 
developments from the period of 1921-1951 as a response to assist those displaced from the 
events of World Wars I and II. 
Prior to 1920, world powers were unconcerned with creating a universal refugee 
definition. Before World War I, European empires still governed vast parts of the world, borders 
were fewer, and  large numbers of Europeans could move to the Americas and other lands 
‘discovered’ by Europe in Australia and New Zealand. However this changed when massive 
                                                             
28 Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” 1046. 
29 Ibid., 1051. 
30 Ibid. 
31 For information on the historic, pre-World Wars I and II treatment of asylum,  see Barnett, “Global 
Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 239-41 and S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and 
International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 5-49. 
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groups of forced migrants began to exist starting with World War I.32 As a result of World War I, 
new states were created that excluded many ethnic minorities from citizenship based on 
languages, ethnicity, location, or religious affiliation.33 The creation of sovereign states allows 
governments to delimit their citizenry, which they did by defining “broad categories of people as 
belonging to the nation-state and relegated others to the ranks of outsiders and aliens who 
threatened national and cultural cohesion.”34  Here we can see how the creation of a sovereign 
state, as well as the power to define members of the state, can actually produce refugee flows 
deeming some citizens without a nationality, or stateless.35
 
 
Russian Displacement 
Refugee law and the refugee regime have its roots in actions that were taken in the early 
twentieth century at the behest of the League of Nations.36 The first major movement of this 
century that was recognized as needing protection were those who were displaced as a result of 
the Russian Revolution in 1917, as more than one million persons fled the Bolshevik Regime 
between 1917 and 1921.37 The first organized efforts for refugee protection took place in 1921, 
when the League of Nations at the request of the International Committee for the Red Cross, 
established a High Commissioner for Refugees, Fredtjof Nansen, who was primarily charged 
with dealing with the issues of forcibly displaced Russians.38
                                                             
32 James C. Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950,” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30, no. 2 (April 1984): 348. 
 
33 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 34. 
34 Ibid., 35. 
35 For example,  after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the territory of the Kurdish 
people, referred to as Kurdistan, was divided between neighboring  territories as they formed sovereign states, 
including Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the former Soviet Union. Due to their ethnic affiliation as Kurds, which 
includes a distinct language and cultural traditions, many Kurds became stateless, which has yet to be resolved.  For 
more information on the issue of Kurdish statelessness and refugee status see Matthew J. Gibney and Randall 
Hansen. Eds., Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005),  
368-373. Another example is the creation of states in Africa based on the colonial borders, which did not accurately 
represent the traditional borders of African peoples. As states were created conflicts erupted and many people were 
excluded from state protection, and many conflicts have arisen over issues of resource distribution and power 
between ethnic groups. Many governments in the region have also become unstable to the point of being considered 
a “failed state,” such as Somalia and Liberia, which have in turn produced mass amounts of refugees. For more 
information on the issues of how the state contributes to refugee production in Africa see Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, 
“The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institutions of the State,” International Journal of Refugee Law 6, 
no. 4 (1994): 562-80. 
36 Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s),” 304. 
37 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 241. 
38 Ibid., 242;  Loescher, Beyond Charity, 36. 
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The creation of this Commissioner was the first time that the issue of refugees was 
recognized in international law. This Refugee Commissioner was given a temporary mandate 
with a limited focus on displaced persons from Russia, so there was no creation of a general 
definition for who was a refugee, but rather a category-oriented approach through which 
displaced persons were identified based on group affiliation and origin.39 Russians were 
identified as a specific group of people that required protection based on certain political 
circumstances.40 The task of this Commissioner was to organize repatriation, to allocate some 
refugees to resettlement countries, and provide general relief.41
However, this limited mandate was problematic, as many other groups were also facing 
severe problems. As issues for displaced Armenians escalated, protection was extended 
specifically to this group in conjunction with the efforts made for Russians.
 
42
Russian refugee: Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy the protection of the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who has not acquired any 
other nationality.  
 In 1926, the 
League of Nations issued an arrangement that dealt with the issuance of identity documents for 
Russian and Armenian refugees and, rather than creating a generals definition, the groups 
eligible for these certificates were simply referred to as ‘Russian refuges’ and ‘Armenian 
refugees’, with simple, straightforward definitions: 
 
Armenian refugee: Any person of Armenian origin, formerly a subject of the Ottoman 
Empire, who does not enjoy the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic 
and who has not acquired any other nationality.43
 
 
Although a definition of refugee is put forth, it is based on geographical origin rather than a 
general definition that can be applied to any person fleeing from any country.  
                                                             
39 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 242.  
40 Ibid.. 
41 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 241-43. 
42 The Armenians were established originally in what is now north-east Turkey, and “since the late 
nineteenth century, [the Armenians] had been systematically persecuted and massacred by the Turkish Government 
as a result of its distinctive religion and culture. In February 1915, Turkey commenced a series of mass deportations 
and indiscriminate killings of Armenians. While the subsequent Allied occupation afforded a degree of protection to 
the Armenians, the massacres began again in October 1921 following the withdrawal of French troops. A mass 
exodus of Armenians to Greece, Bulgaria, Constantinople, Syria and Russia ensued during 1921 and 1922.” See 
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 352-354. 
43 Report by the High Commissioner, League of Nations Doc. 1926.XLII.2 (1926): 5, quoted in Hathaway, 
“The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 353. 
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By the end of 1926 it was clear that Russians and Armenians were not the only persons in 
need of protection, so the League of Nations voted to extend protection to “other categories of 
refugees who, as a consequence of the war, are living under analogous conditions [to those of the 
Russian and Armenian refugees].”44  After much debate and discussion over who should have 
protection,45 as well as what can ‘reasonably expected’ of the League, the final definition that 
was reached extended protection to Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldeaen, and Turkish refugees.46 The 
definitions for these groups is similar to the above definitions for the Russian and Armenian 
refugees, in which it delimits refugees as originating from specific territories and/or events.47 
These definitions did outline some general characteristics, on which refugee status was based, 
namely the “lack of protection and effective non-nationality.”48 That this extension of protection 
was given to only a fraction of those identified as in need of protection by the High 
Commissioner indicates the highly selective nature of the expanded definition. It also created a 
protection gap, which results when “refugee definitions become divorced from events—the 
social and political reality— which actually produces refugees.”49 Although refugee protection 
was granted to Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldaeans, and Turks, the other groups 
that Nansen identified as in need of protection in his original proposal still went on with no 
official international mechanism or international responsibility for protection.50
In 1933, refugee protection for the groups mentioned in the 1926 and 1928 League of 
Nations arrangements (but primarily focused on Russian and Armenians) became regularized in 
the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees.
  
51
                                                             
44 League of Nations O.J. 155, 8, no. 2 (1927), quoted in Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in 
International Law,” 354.   
 In outlining the protection that 
45 The initial proposition from Nansen included providing protection to some 155,000 persons that fell into 
seven categories, including 150 Assyrians, 19,000 Assyro-Chaldaeans, Ruthenians, a number of Montenegrins, 
16,000 Jews, 150 Turks, and some 110,000 persons who were dispersed throughout Central Europe, predominately 
former Hungarians, however the League believed that this was too much, and it was reduced to the above extension 
in the text. See Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 354-355. 
46 Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 355. 
47 For full definition, see Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 356-357. 
48 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 242. 
49 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 17. 
50 The groups listed in Nansen’s original proposal were also chosen selectively based on whether or not 
their conditions were analogous to that of the displaced Russian and Armenians who were already under 
international protection. So in effect even Nansen’s rejected proposal for protection was based on limited criteria of 
those who fit into the general mold of conditions of displacement already configured by the League of Nations. 
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 354-357. 
51See League of Nations, “Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees,” League of Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol. CLIX, No. 3663, (League of Nations, October 28, 1933), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8cf374.html  (accessed February 20, 2012).  
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was given to the defined parties mentioned above, this Convention was created also as an attempt 
to limit repatriation back to their home countries as well as provide some rights for the refugees 
while living in the country of asylum. These rights included education, employment, and the 
right to receive travel documents.52 With this Convention came the regularization of identity 
documents called Nansen Passports,53 recognized by most governments as valid. However, not 
all states were obligated to receive refugees that held these documents.54
 
 Here we see that states 
acknowledged that refugee protection was necessary and important. However, despite such 
recognition, many states were not willing to receive refugees and offer protection themselves, 
which is something that continues to plague the refugee protection system and will be addressed 
in Part II.   
Forced Displacement from Germany 
As the Nazi Party rose to power in Germany, an important population movement began 
as thousands of Jewish persons fled, who were in need of protection. In 1933, the Office for the 
High Commissioner of Refugees coming from Germany was established in order to coordinate 
relief efforts. However it was not until 1936 that efforts began to expand legitimate protection to 
refugees fleeing Germany.55 When the Commissioner was established in Germany, the League 
of Nations instructed the Commissioner to “avoid discussing causes or stressing the political 
dimension of the refugee problem,” so as to not antagonize Germany who was still a member of 
the League of Nations at the time.56 Essentially, the Commission was restricted to providing 
relief, and not confronting the causes of movement. As the scale of the Jewish displacement 
problem continued to grow, states were reluctant to extend protection to them for reasons of 
finance, as the Great Depression was still affecting many countries, as well as the fear that this 
international obligation to protect would impede the nation’s sovereign right to deport non-
citizens.57
                                                             
52 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 38. 
 In 1936, James G. McDonald, the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from 
53 League of Nations, “Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees,” Article 2, stated that 
“Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to issue Nansen certificates . . . to refugees residing regularly in its 
territory,” creating a regularized and internationally unified and recognized system of identity documents for 
displaced persons. See also Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 
242; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 515. 
54 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 242-43.  
55 Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 363. 
56 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 43. 
57 Ibid. 
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Germany, quit his post stating the limitations of the current international response in his 
resignation letter, indicating that: 
The efforts of the private organizations and of any League [of Nations] organization for refugees 
can only mitigate a problem of growing gravity and complexity. In the present economic 
conditions of the world, the European States, and even those overseas, have only a limited power 
of absorption of refugees. The problem must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided.58
 
 
For McDonald, assistance only met part of the problem, but did not confront the causes 
that created the situation of displacement. Additionally, in his letter, McDonald drew attention to 
the human rights abuses that were the cause of refugee movement from Germany, calling for 
states to set aside their concerns of state sovereignty in order meet humanitarian necessities, 
stating that “when domestic politics threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of 
thousands of human beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of 
common humanity.”59 However, calling for countries to meet humanitarian needs failed to spark 
an international intervention.60
In 1936, it was decided that steps should be taken to meet the needs of the displaced 
persons coming from Germany. In the process of planning the Conference for Provisional 
Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany in 1936, although the 
official Convention would not be signed until 1938, the High Commissioner prepared a 
Convention draft, defining the German refugee as:  
 Without a broader definition and established international 
obligations, the situation in Germany evidenced that countries will likely not provide support if 
political or economic interests dictate otherwise. In this case, the unavailability of other countries 
to take in refugees and to assist monetarily in the Commission’s effort resulted in a lack of 
effective protection for displaced Jews.  
any person having left German territory who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of 
the Government of the Reich and who does not possess any nationality other than German 
nationality.61
 
 
The definition that was adopted in the 1936 Conference (mentioned above) was then 
incorporated into the 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from 
Germany,62
                                                             
58 Quoted in Loescher, Beyond Charity, 43. 
 which was slightly different, defining the German refugee as: 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 423. 
61 Draft Provisional Agreement regarding the Status of German Refugees, League of Nations. 
Conf./S.R.A./1(1936), quoted in Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 363. 
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a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other 
nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German 
Government.  
(b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or Agreements who have left Germany 
territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the 
protection of the Germany Government. 
 
This definition differs from the initial proposal in that it extends protection to stateless 
persons who were either living in Germany or outside of Germany, offering a liberalized version 
of the proposed refugee policy, in that it broadens the scope of who can be covered. However, 
like German nationals, it suggests the stateless persons must prove that they do not enjoy 
protection of the German regime.63 There is also the addition of Article 1(2) of the 1938 
Convention, which excludes some from protection, stating “Persons who leave Germany for 
reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in this definition.”64 The minutes of the 
meeting for the draft process of this Convention indicate that the persons in mind for the 
exclusion clause were those who "persons who had left Germany for economic reasons but 
without being compelled to do so, or [who] had gone abroad in order to evade taxation".65 This 
article indicates that there must be evidence of persecution based on specific types of violence, 
not generalized violence or wartime conditions. Whereas in the past a category-oriented 
approach was utilized, this definition was comparatively strict,66
It is interesting to note that the United States took little notice of the refugee problem 
coming from Germany, failed to increase their immigration quotas to account for the increasing 
need for persons to be resettled, and failed to sign any of the drafted Conventions.
 making refugee status more 
difficult to obtain.  
67
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
62 “Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany,” League of Nations Treaty 
Series, Vol. CXCII, No. 446, (League of Nations, February 10, 1938): 59, 
 However, in 
July 1938, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a meeting in Evian in France, to discuss 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,LON,,DEU,,3dd8d12a4,0.html, (accessed February 21, 2012). 
63 Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 365. 
64League of Nations, “Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany.” 
65 Provisional Minutes of the International Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Concerning the 
Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, League of Nations Doc. Conf./C.S.R.A./P.V.5 (1938): 7, quoted in 
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 365.   
66Also note that this protection was extended to those also fleeing from Austria, in an additional provision 
to the 1938 Convention.  “Additional Protocol to the Provisional Arrangement and to the Convention concerning the 
Status of Refugees Coming from Germany,” League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CXCVIII No. 4634, (League of 
Nations, September 14, 1939): 141, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8d1fb4.html, (accessed February 21, 
2012). 
67 Loescher, Beyond Charity,44. 
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the increasing issue of resettling refugees coming from Germany and Austria.68 This meeting 
failed as it achieved little in terms of actual change in resettlement policies, but rather 
“reaffirmed the extreme reluctance of the United States and the rest of the world to offer a 
lifeline to Jewish refugees.”69 From this meeting, one can see how the financial burden of 
refugees and asylum seekers entered discourse, as Germany was not allowing Jews to leave with 
their assets and many countries were concerned with the economic cost of taking in resettled 
refugees as unemployment was high in many countries and finances were unstable as a result of 
the Great Depression.70
 
 
The Interwar Organizations   
However, the Evian conference did result in the creation of another new refugee 
mechanism, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), which operated outside the 
sphere of the League of Nations and was tasked with negotiating with Germany about Jewish 
migration,71
1) persons who have not already left their country of origin (Germany, including Austria), but 
who must emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs or racial origin, 
and (2) persons as defined in (1) who have already left their country of origin and who have 
not yet established themselves permanently elsewhere
 in order to facilitate involuntary migration for  
72
 
   
Here, protection was extended to potential refugees who have not/or were unable to leave the 
country, qualifying them as refugees in need of protection.73 However, this definition also 
limited assistance to those that were fleeing on account of political opinion, religious beliefs, or 
issues of racial origin. It based decision-making on individual consideration of the merits of 
claims, rather than assumption of de jure or de facto lack of protection for certain categories.74 
The IGCR attempted to work with Germany to “achieve an orderly exodus of Jews, who would 
be allowed to take their property and possessions with them,”75
                                                             
68 Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of International Protection of Refugees,” International Review of the Red 
Cross no. 843 (September 30, 2001): 731. 
 yet in actuality the Germans did 
not let Jews leave without sacrificing most of their possessions. With the states in West unwilling 
69 Loescher, Beyond Charity,45. 
70 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 243. 
71 Loescher, Beyond Charity,44. 
72 Jaegner, “On the History of International Protection of Refugees,” 731; Hathaway, “The Evolution of 
Refugee Status in International Law,” 371. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 371 
75 Ibid., emphasis added.  
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to finance a resettlement program, the exit from Germany and entrance to Western countries was 
effectively closed.76 Essentially, the mass murder of Jews that happened at this time was “tacitly 
tolerated” by much of the Western world until it was too late:77 “Jews were victim of 
international complacency and diplomatic priorities”.78
After World War II, the League of Nations had dissolved, as had its High Commissioner 
for Refugees. To continue the Commissioner’s efforts, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created by Allied powers in November 1943.
 
79 The 
UNRRA was primarily concerned with providing assistance to “civilian nationals of the allied 
nations and to displaced persons in liberated countries, and with the repatriation and return of 
prisoners of war”, and was not authorized to resettle displaced persons or find ‘solutions’ for 
refugees who were unable to return home.80 Initially, those persons that were unable to return 
home were referred to the IGCR for assistance. However, in August 1945, the UNRRA 
Resolution 71 created the expansion of the UNRRA focus to include refugee protection, with the 
statement that aid may be extended to "other persons who have been obliged to leave their 
country or place of origin or former residence."81 Over the next year there was debate over how 
to define the persons to whom this protection should be extended to, primarily between the 
Washington and London offices of the UNRRA. There was also criticism from the Eastern Bloc, 
who resented UNRRA efforts that facilitated the emigration of their nationals.82 This definition 
was not based on subjective determinants, so the definition meant that “only persons suffering 
from objectively demonstrable incompatibility with their State of origin could receive the 
benefits of refugee status.”83
Although the UNRRA and IGCR were both working to provide assistance to some forced 
migrants in Europe, three years after the end of the war there were still over three million 
displaced Europeans who had yet to find a solution to their problem. Thus, another organization 
 
                                                             
76 Loescher, Beyond Charity,45. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 243. 
79 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 109; Hathaway, “The Evolution of 
Refugee Status in International Law,” 372. 
80 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 109. 
81 “UNRRA Journal 152 for the text of Resolution 71” (1945), quoted in Hathaway, “The Evolution of 
Refugee Status in International Law,” 373. 
82 For further discussion of the Eastern-Western dynamics in the UNRRA debate, see Hathaway, “The 
Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 373-74. 
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was created to take over the task of finding a solution to the situation in Europe, the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO). The UNRRA was primarily funded by the US, which contributed 
approximately 70 per cent of the UNRRA funds. However, the US was very critical of the 
UNRRA operations, particularly their repatriation and rehabilitation efforts in the Eastern Bloc.84 
In order to remedy their concerns, the US pulled their funding from UNRRA, effectively ending 
the organization, and worked to create the IRO in December 1946.85 The US believed that the 
UNRRA was potentially empowering and consolidating the Eastern Soviet powers by sending 
back persons and providing aid through rehabilitation programs. Thus, to rectify this, the primary 
function of the IRO was to be for resettlement of displaced persons, not repatriation.86
 Prior to the creation of the IRO, refugee organizations had dealt with specific groups of 
refugees. However, the IRO mandate was the first time that a more general definition was put 
forward for ‘refugee’.
 
87 The IRO was the first time that refugee status was based on individual 
rather than group determination, as well as the acceptance of the individual’s right to flee from 
persecution.88 The IRO utilized an individual determination procedure for persons who were 
victims of the Nazi government or similar regimes, as well as victims of persecution for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and refugees of long standing,89 who “in complete 
freedom and after receiving full knowledge of the facts…expressed valid objections to returning 
to [their countries of origin].”90 A ‘valid objection’ could be a demonstration that the person 
feared persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; if the individual 
raised political objections, the IRO would then judge the validity of the objection.91
                                                             
84 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 49. 
 Persons who 
were involved with movements hostile to any of the United Nations’ member states were 
excluded from this protection, as well as “[r]efugees returning to their country of origin, 
acquiring a new nationality, becoming firmly established, unreasonably refusing to accept IRO 
repatriation or resettlement proposals, failing to make a substantial effort towards earning a 
living when able to do so, or otherwise exploiting the IRO ceased to be of concern to the 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 51; Dennis Gallagher, “The Evolution of  the International Refugee System,” International 
Migration Review 23, no. 3 (1989): 579. 
87Loescher, Beyond Charity, 50. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 244. 
90Quoted in Hathaway “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 374. 
91Ibid., 375 
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[IRO].”92
 Although the IRO was utilizing a more general definition of a refugee, the 
organization was targeting those displaced by World War II, as well as some of the new Cold 
War refugees. The definition was the most comprehensive and functional definition when 
compared with other refugee organizations at the time. Thus, by mid-1947, the IRO took over the 
operations of the UNRRA, the IGCR, and the former activities of the League of Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.
  
93
The 1951 Convention and the creation of the UNHCR 
 
When the war came to an end in 1945, it left some 30 million people uprooted and 
displaced, ‘soldiers and displaced people who did not want or could not return home because of 
border changes, including more than 12 million ethnic Germans who were expelled from the 
Soviet Union.’94  The IRO was able to resettle over one million refugees between 1947 and 1951 
(primarily in the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel, and other Western European 
countries).95  The IRO was meant to complete its activities in June 1950, however when this time 
approached it was clear that the ‘problem’ of refugees was not solved, especially with the new 
refugees arriving from East and Central Europe;96 in its final report to the United Nations 
General Assembly, they cautioned that the temporary problem they were tasked with targeting 
was quickly becoming a permanent issue.97
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created during the 
height of these tensions on 1 January, 1951, taking over where the IRO left off.
 
98 UNHCR was 
created to ‘“provide international protection’ and ‘permanent solutions for the problem of 
refugees’”. Its activities were to be “of an entirely non-political character—it is to be 
‘humanitarian’ and ‘social’ and to relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees.”99
                                                             
92 Hathaway “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 375-76. 
  In 
July 1951, drawing on their experiences of international efforts to assist refugees, reaching back 
93Ibid., 376 
94 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide (London: Frank Cass, 1999), quoted 
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to 1920, the United Nations created the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,100 
which was to be supervised by UNHCR, further regularizing refugees and setting out several 
rights that refugees are entitled to. The 1951 Convention does not explicitly grant the right to 
obtain asylum, as its purpose is to define the scope of the right to seek and enjoy asylum which is 
found in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.101  The 1951 Convention, in 
the series of treaties pertaining to displaced persons, was more comprehensive than previous 
Conventions and arrangements. This Convention outlines the refugees’ right to remain in the 
country of asylum, the right to return to their home country, the principle of non-refoulement, as 
well as minimum standards for treatment by the host country, an outline for determination 
procedures, and eligibility criteria for asylum.102
The most contentious portion of the 1951 Convention is arguably article 1, which defines who 
can and cannot become a refugee. According to this article, a refugee is someone who is outside 
their country of residence and,  
  Although it is out of the scope of this paper to 
discuss every aspect of the 1951 Convention in detail, a brief overview of refugee rights and 
state obligations, and special attention to how a refugee is defined is pertinent to the present 
discussion.  
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.103
 
 
Due to a disagreement between the drafters of the Convention, governments were also given the 
option of limiting refugee protection to those coming from Europe, or had the option to open it to 
those coming from “Europe and elsewhere.”104
                                                             
100 Hereafter referred to as the 1951 Convention  
 Following the IRO, this definition was 
“individual-oriented and emphasized the causes of flight rather than relying on the more 
categorical approach that focused on the origin of specific groups”, which most groups prior to 
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the IRO utilized.105 Looking at the previous sections, one can see that the definition has its roots 
in the conditions used by IRO. These five categories/grounds of persecution (race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, and political opinion) that were included in 
the 1951 Convention definition have ties to the period during and in between World War I and II, 
in which most persons were persecuted for these reasons.106 Additionally, the emphasis on 
persons being ‘outside the country of his former habitual residence’ “emphasizes the territorial 
nature of the refugee regimes, reinforcing respect for sovereignty, and the inability of an 
international organization to look within a nation’s borders.”107
The restrictions in the definition were likely done, first and foremost, because, as 
previously stated, the definition was created with a particular group of persons in mind, but also 
to restrict the numbers of persons who qualified for protection as well as to identify those 
individuals, within the larger context of forced displacement, who required special international 
legal protection.
 This notion will be discussed 
further in Part II.  
108
Those asylum-seekers that are found to fit into the definition listed in Article 1 of the 
1951 Convention are entitled to certain rights while in the country of asylum, including, but not 
limited to, the right to access courts
   
109the right to gainful employment,110 the right to housing,111 
and the right to public education,112 as well as the right to move freely within the territory of the 
state113 and obtain identity papers and/or travel documents.114
States are able to make reservations to parts of the Convention (i.e. access to public 
services or to employment). However they cannot make reservations to the definition, as well as 
the principle of non-refoulement,
 Many of these rights were in 
addition to the rights granted under the aforementioned Conventions dealing with displaced 
persons.  
115
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 in which no state “shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee 
106 Gallagher, “The Evolution of  the International Refugee System,” 580. 
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in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened.”116 To ensure this, Article 31 stipulates that “Contracting States shall not impose 
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence on refugees who, coming directly from a 
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1,”117
In addition to granting the above rights to refugees, signatory states also have the 
responsibility to cooperate with UNHCR in its functions and applying the convention, including 
providing reports on the condition of refugees, the implementation of the Convention, and on 
national legislation or decrees that enter into force regarding refugees.
 as obtaining the 
required legal documents may not be possible in their country of origin. 
118
UNHCR, the organization charged with implementing and overseeing the 1951 
Convention, was initially provided with a three year mandate, with a small budget and restricted 
fundraising capacity
 Unlike previous 
treaties, the 1951 Convention was more detailed and broad, as it did not take a nationality-
specific approach to providing asylum, however it was also more restrictive in that the asylum-
seeker must ‘prove’ their need for protection based on certain criteria. 
119; this also accounts for the temporal limitation of the Convention, as it 
was likely assumed that when the mandate of UNHCR ended, the convention would cease to be 
necessary. However, as the Cold War continued to produce refugees, UNHCR quickly moved 
away from post-War reconstruction into involvement in the Cold War.120 The first crisis that 
UNHCR dealt with was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956121
The political scene in the 1950s was very polarized, between the East and the West, 
between communism and capitalism, and arguably the refugee definition centered on this 
ideological opposition.
 and in the following years, persons 
from many countries in the Eastern Bloc. 
122
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 With Communist refugees, resettlement was less of an issue, as 
communist refugees were ideologically significant to Western policymakers, specifically in the 
United States, and in fact Western governments encouraged refugee movement from the Eastern 
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117 Ibid. 
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War struggle.”123 The United States government became very involved in refugee resettlement 
and aid, even setting up the United States Escapee Program to facilitate defections from the 
Soviet countries.124
With some states taking control of much of the refugee protection and resettlement 
during the Cold War, the implications of which will be discussed in Part II and III, UNHCR was 
free to become involved in other refugee movements.
 
125 During the Cold War, two refugee 
regimes emerged: the first was among the industrialized countries of the First World126 accepting 
refugees from Communist states; and the second was for forcible displacement in the rest of the 
world, namely the Third World.127  As discussed previously, refugees coming from the Soviet 
countries during the Cold War were a political tool for the anti-communist regimes of Western 
Europe and North America, particularly the United States. During the Cold War, persons fleeing 
were effectively “voting with their feet,”128 and added to the ideological battle that was ensuing 
between the West and East. The logic of this regime was to utilize refugee movement to 
destabilize governments and cause states to fail, reflected in the domestic policies that 
encouraged refugees to flee the Eastern Bloc.129 Throughout the Cold War, these two regimes 
existed side by side, as the one regime instigated Eastern instability and insecurity, while the 
other regime was a protection and containment mechanism for civil wars and proxy wars 
happening in the Third World.130 During this time, UNHCR became an organization that focused 
much of its work in the Third World.131
Through the 1960s and 1970s, UNHCR’s attention was on territories in Africa and Asia 
that were experiencing many civil wars as they went through the process of decolonization, 
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perhaps evidencing the failure of the Westphalian state outside of the First World.132 Some of 
these wars were independent from the Cold War, while others were proxy wars133 between the 
West and East, such as those in Indochina, Afghanistan, Central America, the Horn of Africa, 
and Southern Africa.134 During this period UNHCR was involved in operations on three different 
continents, and as they became increasingly independent, they were given a larger budget.135
 In Africa specifically, refugees were more often self-settled and were able to integrate 
into the host communities with little or no problems, so much of UNHCR assistance in the 1960s 
was targeted at emergency aid rather than repatriation.
 
However, unlike in Europe, the functions of the Third World refugee support during this time 
were not legal or diplomatic, but rather “they concerned the monetary support for and the 
development of direct assistance programs for refugees  
136 However, as these new refugees began 
to emerge, the temporal limit of the 1951 Convention, which made protection limited to those 
displaced prior to 1951, started to become problematic to UNHCR efforts.137
 In 1967, in response to the “globalization” of the refugee issue, a protocol was added to the 
1951 Convention, 
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 which made the Convention apply to persons displaced after 1951 and 
allowing them to benefit from its protections. The 1967 Protocol, however, was a separate 
instrument, which required a separate signature and ratification process. States are not required 
to sign the protocol, although most have. Overall the 1951 Convention did not change, although 
more persons (namely non-Europeans) were now included under its protection. Other regional 
definitions were created based on the 1951 Convention definition which broadened the definition 
of who can be a refugee, acknowledging the regional needs (and the realities of refugee 
production), the most important of which is the definition adopted in the 1969 Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, signed by the Organization of American States in 
133 Due to the nuclear power on both sides of the Cold War conflict, proxy battles in the non-aligned Third 
World served another purposes in this ideological battle:  to win political allies and forge alliances in developing 
countries – supporting opposing sides in civil wars within the Third World.  Keely, “The International Refugee 
Regime(s),” 308. 
134 Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” 
International Migration Review 35, no. 1(Spring 2001): 40-42. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Gallagher, “The Evolution of the International Refugee System,” 583. 
137 Loescher, Beyond Charity, 80; Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International 
Refugee Regime,”248. 
138 Hereafter referred to as the ‘1967 Protocol’ 
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1984. Both of these documents, and specifically their refugee definitions, will be discussed in 
Part III. 
The 1951 Convention is one of the most widely-ratified international law instruments. 
Through previous sections, which traced the various definitions and approaches to refugee 
protection during the thirty year period of World War I and World War II, one can see that the 
concept and definition of a refugee is a “malleable legal concept which can take on different 
meanings as required by the nature and scope of the dilemma prompting involuntary 
migration.”139
PART II: CRITIQUES AND REFORMS 
 However, the 1951 Convention definition that was created for refugees displaced 
in Europe as a result of war has proved the most enduring and is still used today, with no changes 
to the original text. So one must then ask, has the legal concept of refugee ceased to be as 
malleable, flexible and responsive to contemporary realities as it was before 1951? Is it possible 
for such an instrument to properly protect non-European peoples that are forcibly displaced? 
 
The consequences of demarcating the concept of ‘refugee’ are more than merely 
definitional. The definition affects political processes, shapes legal discourse, highlights certain 
motivations of governments, attributes causality and responsibility for displacement, and asserts 
the priorities and limits of humanitarianism, among other things. As Shacknove states, 
‘refugeehood’ goes beyond a simple definition, as having this definition is predicated on the 
moral idea that there is a minimal, normalized “relation of rights and duties between the citizen 
and the state, the negation of which engenders refugees.” as well as an empirical claim in which 
the consequences of this bond being broken is persecution and alienage.140
However, since the end of the Cold War, refugees are no longer necessarily in easily 
defined ‘acceptable categories’ that were envisioned upon drafting the 1951 Convention. 
International refugee law was created as a response to assist the victims of World War II, and has 
not been able to accommodate the “contemporary realities of mass exodus,” which are 
predominantly a matter of economics and governments’ political strategies.
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The refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention was a product of World War II and 
the Cold War, and is Euro-centric in its focus, as the displaced persons in question were 
European, displaced within Europe.142 Upon its creation states did not contemplate (or intend) 
for it to be a universally applicable instrument or standard, as the Convention was limited to the 
events happening prior to 1951. The definition was created to fit a “foreseeable number of 
beneficiaries who fell in the acceptable categories.”143 The system of refugee protection that was 
designed for post-World War II refugees is still used today. However, the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol, 144
Since the end of the Cold War, although more migrants and displaced persons began to 
arrive in the countries of the global north from the global south, the Convention has not been 
applied so as to offer adequate protection to these migrants. Instead, since the Cold War ended, 
the definition has been interpreted more strictly by northern states, creating the phenomenon of 
the non-entrée state.
 which are the cornerstone of international refugee law, have arguably failed to 
meet the needs of the ever-changing demographics of affected populations seeking protection.  
145
In order to see the holes within international refugee protection, it is important to 
understand the dominant critiques and varied interpretations of meaningful protection. The 
critiques also shed light on the reality of the refugee regime, specifically that most of the policy 
and financial control lies in the global north. This power divide has direct impacts on the 
protection of refugees originating from impoverished countries of the global south.   
 These persons represented different situations of displacement when 
compared to Europe during World Wars I and II and the Cold War, and in response a change 
occurred in the regime charged with the protection of refugees. In an attempt to make the 1951 
Convention relate to contemporary displacement, refugee status and protection has acquired 
various new definitions, standards, and labels.  However, many of these labels and standards 
come at the cost of meaningful protection. As a reaction to the policy changes regarding 
refugees, many academics have proposed ways in which refugee law can be enhanced, usually 
either through underscoring the human rights and humanitarian element of international refugee 
law, or through reconfiguring communication within the refugee regime. 
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The Post-Cold War Change and the Non-Entrée Regime 
Prior to the mid-1980s, towards the end of the Cold War, the obligation to help refugees, 
as victims of war, was for the most part unchallenged, as a ‘refugee’ was well-defined as a 
person outside of their country of residence due to a well-founded fear of persecution, and there 
was no question as to who the persecutor was.146 Up until the mid-1980s, most of the refugees 
that made their way into Western Europe shared similar cultural and ideological values, namely 
anti-Communism and anti-fascism, and according to many scholars, this ideological affiliation 
was enough for the host society to be generally accepting of refugees,147 and the refugee 
movement in the Third World was largely contained there. However, during the 1980s an 
increasing amount of asyulm seekers were arriving from the Third World, or more specifically, 
from countries that were impoverished and culturally different, compared to the refugees that had 
previously arrived in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
during the periods after and during World War II, as well as during the Cold War.148
 These new refugees that were entering the First World “no longer possessed ideological 
or political value,”
  
149 as many were fleeing conflicts that had less direct impact or geopolitical 
relevance on the host society; there was also a less clear indication of persecution and persecutor 
than there was in the past. Rather than ideological and political assets, these new refugees were 
now considered liabilities,150
The arrival of these new refugees marked a shift in international refugee law, which 
worked through the construction of the “myth of difference,” which is the idea that “the nature 
and character of refugee flows in the Third World were represented as being radically different 
from the refugee flows in Europe since the end of the First World War,” and in so doing an 
image of a ‘normal’ refugee was constructed as “white, male and anti-communist,” which 
contrasted sharply with the new refugees that were entering from the global south.
 and were unwanted by the host societies, as their presence did not 
service a larger political goal.  
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After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, travel was much easier as 
borders were easier to cross, which also meant that the number of refugee claims increased.152 In 
response to the increase in international migration, states began to tighten their border controls 
and immigration policies, as well as restricting asylum policies. The increasing amount of 
migrants and refugees from the global south and Eastern Europe that were different in terms of 
culture, ethnicity, religion, or language, in comparison to the inter-war periods, made a more 
clearly defined migrant ‘other’ in the mind of the public, and challenged the cultural identity of 
many countries as migration rates rose.153 Concerns for security became the justification behind 
many of these border restrictions at the forefront of immigration control, and the terrorist attacks 
that took place in 2001 gave governments the further justification to put concerns of security at 
the forefront of the immigration debate, and develop policies that matched these concerns.154 
With the advancement of border and visa technology and territories reconfigured in terms of 
immigration responsibility, we have created what is often referred to as the “non-entrée regime,” 
155
Many refugees enter territory in the same way as international migrants, and seeking 
protection is now more difficult as many states have minimized claims to refugee status by 
enforcing stricter visa, transportation and other access controls into the territory.
 which describes the reformulation of refugee policy in the post-Cold-War era, consisting of 
restrictive measures that prevent asylum seekers and international migrants from entry into the 
territory, as well as limiting the number of recognized refugees.  
156 Today, 
governments are concerned with how porous their borders are, and are constantly developing 
new measures to better manage borders.157
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 Going hand-in-hand with the rhetoric of the non-
entrée regime is the way in which some countries have ‘expanded’ their borders or utilized 
‘remote control’ mechanisms by implementing extraterritorial immigration control mechanisms. 
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State authorities use these expansions “[t]o check the legality of people’s movement before they 
embark, with the help of the local authorities and with air or land carriers, avoid[ing] the painful 
and expensive problems in sending them back if they are not the one who should be 
travelling.”158 The most well-known systems of this sort are the most sought after destinations of 
asylum-seekers of the European Union countries, the United States, and Australia.   The EU’s 
external border agency, known as FRONTEX, is tasked with protecting the external borders of 
the EU states, namely the southern Mediterranean border, to prevent irregular migrants entering 
primarily from North and West Africa.159 In the United States this can be seen with the 
interdiction policies it has with countries in the Caribbean, namely Cuba, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, which began in the 1980s. These policies allow the US to intercept boats 
with migrants coming from these countries, and send them back to that particular country or 
detain them in facilities such as the notorious Guantanamo Bay until their claim for protection 
has been heard.160 Similar to the US, is Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’, which is “mainly 
concerned with vessels arriving from Indonesia, and typically involved migrants with plausible 
claims to protection as refugees”, 161 coming mainly from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka, 
with extraterritorial processing taking place in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New 
Guinea.162
For many persons coming from refugee producing countries, whether they are migrants, 
refugees, or even just tourists, obtaining a visa to legally enter countries of the global north, 
particularly within the EU, US and Australia, is difficult, as restrictions are imposed on the 
applicant, including proof of the financial resources to maintain a temporary stay in the 
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country.163 These new restrictive measures, including extraterritorial processing, have led asylum 
to become increasingly treated like irregular migration, as legal entry into the country is more 
difficult, however, it is important to maintain that refugees are not irregular migrants.164  
Refugee law, in theory, has protection mechanisms165 in place to ensure that persons entering 
territory who have a claim to refugee status should be attended to in accordance with 
international law; and with these protections, it is “completely inappropriate to stigmatize 
refugees arriving without visas as law breakers when a treaty we have freely signed provides 
exactly the contrary.”166  With the exception of international refugee law, international law 
largely ignores issues of migration,167 and states are free to open and close their borders as they 
see fit. As the world continues to globalize and become more open in terms or trade and capital, 
control over population movement has become the last stronghold of territorial sovereignty, 
which wealthy refugee receiving countries in the global north guard with fierce politics and large 
budgets.168
In response to the general increase of international migrants, states have prioritized ideas 
of state sovereignty, security and cultural preservation over international obligations to protect 
and provide asylum to refugees. The establishment of refugee law was to legitimate the 
protectionist norm, while also creating a “reasonable accommodation between the inevitability of 
special claims and the sovereignty of the states to which those claims are addressed.”
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However, placing asylum-seekers into the broader category of international migration has had 
devastating effects on the protection that they are able to receive; when asylum seekers are 
treated as international migrants, the ‘protectionist norm’ inherent in refugee law is lost.  
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International refugee law is based on a humanitarian premise.170 However, today the 
refugee regime in the global north is “fundamentally concerned with the protection of powerful 
states.”171
Definitions, Labels and Navigating the System 
 The discussion of refugees is no longer one of protection for the refugee, but rather 
protection of the state, through policies (or at least policies in practice) that reinforce the 
sovereignty of the nation state, as mentioned above. Refugee law and policy has moved from its 
humanitarian foundation to the preservation and reaffirmation of State’s power, many times at 
the cost of protection. With the increase (and perceived fear) of international migration and 
refugee movement towards the global north, as well as the ‘undesirable’ socio-economic make 
up of these movements, and the real difficulties in distinguishing between those who are refugees 
and those who are economic migrants, keeping in mind that  two categories are not mutually 
exclusive. Governments have begun to treat migration policy and refugee policy as though they 
are one. 
According to Rees “refugee and asylum laws arise precisely from the recognition that 
there may be people whom [the global north] would otherwise not admit as immigrants, but who 
need protection”.172
The right to leave a country where there is a well-founded fear of persecution, and seek 
asylum
  Given that contemporary migration policies work to restrict entry to specific 
types of migrants,  as well as the lack of consistency in application of refugee status 
determination procedures across states, it seems that refugee law, rather than a tool for 
protection, is potentially being utilized to deny entry and/or legal stay in the country.   
173 in another country is, in theory, still there, but has become more difficult to implement 
and realize.174 Rather than a right, refugee status is now a privileged status, as governments have 
become more restrictive in who can claim this status, arguing that asylum claims are abused by 
economic migrants to gain entry into the host country.175
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  Now, rather than simply being a 
‘refugee,’ there is a wide array of labels that an asylum-seeker can receive in many countries. 
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Zetter discusses this issue at length in terms of the “refugee label,” or rather the difficulty in 
receiving this label.176 Several countries in the global north have remade the refugee label, and 
rather than a tool for protection, it has become much more blurred, as it has been “buried in the 
apparently neutral, apolitical requirements of immigration procedures and bureaucracies which 
are part of the much larger apparatus of state power and state interests,”177 essentially 
intertwining the refugee process into the larger body of migration, and are “the tangible 
representation of [government] policies and programs.”178
Further “burying” the refugee label is the creation of new labels in the processing chain, 
most notably “temporary protection.” Temporary protection is sometimes viewed positively, as it 
fills the protection gap for those forced migrants who do not fit into the 1951 Convention 
criteria, often fleeing generalized violence, as this protection is often granted on an ad hoc basis 
to specific groups of refugees.
   
179  However, the reality is that in some countries temporary 
protection is often used as a substitute protection and as a “restrictive mechanism to reduce 
refugee rights and prevent integration.”180 Persons who receive temporary protection often 
receive fewer rights than ‘Convention refugees,’ and these actions could arguably be seen as a 
threat to the 1951 Convention, and can “form part of a strategy to de-legalize refugee protection 
and to relocate it in the realm of politics and humanitarian assistance.”181 Temporary protection 
thus has the potential to make refugee protection, and the rights granted in the 1951 Convention, 
cease to be an international legal obligation through creating a loophole of sorts, which can 
“intercept access to the most prized claim:” refugee status.182
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However getting access to the prized label of a ‘refugee’ (or any label for that matter) 
means navigating through a system that was created for a very different type of displacement 
situation than those experienced by current refugee flows. As stated previously, since the end of 
the Cold War, refugee flows have been predominately coming from the global south, and those 
that do make it to the territory of the wealthier countries of the global north, often differ 
culturally, religiously, and linguistically than the host society. The refugee definition found in the 
1951 Convention was written at a time and under conditions that were different. This creates 
questions of whether or not the 1951 Convention and the rights granted therein can be practically 
applied in today’s society.  
Some will argue that the definition is not out of date because it is broad enough to 
encompass any type of persecution, as well as the fact that the 1951 Convention “remains the 
sole, legally binding, international instrument providing specific protection to refugees.”183  The 
1951 Convention has, in fact, created the basis of the international response to forced migration 
and is one of the most widely accepted international legal instruments.184 In order for a definition 
to be universal, as this refugee definition is supposed to be it must not be too detailed or precise, 
in order to be flexible. However one can also argue that the drafters of the definition “eventually 
abandoned efforts to be more precise, because they already had a clear understanding of whom 
they had in mind [for protection].”185
When mass flows of refugees and forced migrants move from, for example, Burma to 
Thailand, from Rwanda into Burundi, or from Sudan to Chad, “we are prepared to assume that 
they are refugees, or even that they should be considered as such despite not fitting within the 
letter of the law.” However, when movements happen closer to home, countries in the global 
north often assume the opposite.
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Interpreting the definition 
The process of receiving one of many labels in the global north, as well as in many 
countries in the global south, is marked by a lengthy court hearing, in which facts are checked, 
stories are tested, and all efforts are made to ensure that the person who is claiming asylum is a 
bona fide refugee.  Asylum-seekers often find themselves in a system that is over-legalized, and 
“often mires the process in a legal formalism that divorces procedures from humanitarianism.”187
The first obstacle is whether or not the asylum-seeker fits into the parameters set forth in 
the 1951 Convention definition, which is the definition utilized in most refugee systems in the 
global north.
 
What is lacking in the current systems of refugee status determination (RSD) is consistency and 
predictability, which is important to any legal system being implemented in an effective manner. 
Without consistency and predictability, questions arise as to fairness, as well as the effectiveness 
of the protection system.  
188 Interpreting the refugee definition is a recognized problem. The definition used 
in the 1951 Convention has become more muddled than ever, as who is defining and why creates 
a wide array of definitions. Definitions vary as governments, lawyers, and others “manipulate the 
interpretation within relatively complicated legal terms.”189
Due to the fact that the refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention could be 
interpreted broadly, as well as restrictively, “virtually every work of the core phrase of the 
refugee definition has been subject to interpretive dispute”
 In theory, the definition in the 1951 
Convention could be interpreted more broadly to offer protection to wider array of persons, but 
the reality is in fact the opposite.   
190
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meanings (and restrictions) are understood. To understand how the definition is now applied, it is 
important to go over the main portions that are interpreted. Generally speaking, a person must 
meet three interrelated conditions in order to garner refugee status:191 being abroad,192
The beginning of the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention states that a refugee is a 
person who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted.” 
 the fear of 
persecution, and the lack of protection.  
193   The meaning of ‘persecution’ and 
‘well-founded fear’ are constantly challenged and analyzed. As these terms are not defined 
clearly in the 1951 Convention or other international instruments, academics, lawyers, and others 
are constantly working out what meaning should be attributed to the terms ‘well-founded fear’ 
and ‘persecution.’ The element of a well-founded fear of persecution “is clearly the most 
important factor concerning the determination of refugee status”, as the “other elements of the 
definition i.e. outside the country of origin, nationality, or habitual residence, coupled with 
unwillingness to return are essentially questions of fact.”194
The term ‘persecution’ first entered international relations with regard to refugees in the 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, was an organization created in 1946 to deal with the issue of World War II refugees.
 Thus persecution and well-founded 
fear are the elements that indicate whether these questions of fact are relevant to receiving 
protection. 
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191 Atle Grahl-Madsen, “Refugees Within the Competence of the United Nations,” paper read at the 22nd 
AWR Congress in Geneva, October 13, 1972, published in AWR Bulletin 12, no. 21 (1974): 16-22. In The Land 
Beyond: Collected Essays on Refugees Law and Policy, edited by Peter Macalister-Smith and Gudmundur 
Alfredsson, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International: 2001), 89. 
 
There seems to be no apparent or specific reason for the use of the word ‘persecution’ in the IRO 
draft constitution, but its purpose was to define those persons who would have valid objections to 
returning to their home country and thus would allow them to fall under the mandate of the 
192 The first part of the definition found in Article 1(A)2, indicates that a person must be outside the country 
of his nationality.” This issue will not be discussed at length in this chapter, as it will be dealt with later, however, in 
the view of Hathaway alienage, or being outside of one’s home country, is a key component to 
refugeehood/receiving protection, because the “international community can only make a real guarantee of rights to 
persons who are outside their own country - the notion of alienage is key to the making of real guarantees of 
protection is built into the definition of a refugee.” Hathaway, “Why Refugee Law Still Matters,” 98. 
193 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Article 1(A)2  
194 Paul Weiss, “The Travaux Préparatoires Analyzed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis,” Cambridge 
International Document Series 7, The Refugee Convention, (1995): 7. 
195 Ivor C. Jackson, “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis For 
Protection,” International Journal of Refugee Law 3, no. 3 (1991): 405. 
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IRO.196 The term ‘persecution’ was also included in the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 
Convention, “almost automatically, and without any discussion of its substantive meaning.”197 
However, today this term has been given much attention. It is out of the purview of this paper to 
fully explore this issue. However it is important to have a general understanding of what this 
term implies (or does not imply) in international legal procedures. The international refugee law 
academic community gives much weight to the works of Alte Grahl-Madsen, James C. 
Hathaway and Guy Goodwin-Gill.198
The more conservative reading of the meaning of ‘persecution’ is a threat to life or 
freedom (i.e., death/execution, arbitrary detention, torture, etc.), predominately for a political 
reason (in line with the idea of refugees as ‘political refugees’),
  However, among these leading scholars, a unified 
understanding of ‘persecution’ is not evident. 
199 whereas the more broad 
interpretation of ‘persecution’ is any sort of sustained violation of human rights.200 There is no 
consensus to what this term exactly means, however certain general ideas accepted by most 
scholars201 is that persecution indicates a failure of state protection, risk to civil and political 
rights202, and risk to (some) economic social and cultural rights.203
When analyzing the construction of the 1951 Convention definition, Jackson adds to this 
discussion, stating that “[i]n any event, the notion of ‘persecution’ was not introduced in order to 
   
                                                             
196 The term ‘persecution’ was introduced by the was introduced by the Special Committee on Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, established by the Economic and Social Council in 1946, and although no specific reason for  
this word choice is evident, Jackson believes that perhaps it was simply to ensure that persons claiming this status 
had more than just a ‘general dislike’ for their home governments, but rather had a tangible fear upon return;  see 
also Jackson, “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis For Protection,” 405-406. 
197 Jackson, “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis For Protection,” 406. 
198 See Alte Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Volume 1 and 2 , ed.  A.W. 
Sijthoff (Leyden:   1966  and 1972); James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), 
91-134; and Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law. 
199 See for example, Alte Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Volume 1 and 2, and 
Paul Weis, “The Concept of Refugee in International Law,” Journal du Droit International, 87, (1960): 929-1001. 
200 See for example Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 101. For Hathaway, ‘persecution’ should be 
defined as “the sustained violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.” 
201 For a further explanation of the following list, including examples see Hathaway, The Law of Refugee 
Status, 99-134. 
202 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which includes rights around issues such 
as executions, assault, torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest, detention, denial of freedom of movement, as well as the 
denial of freedom of opinion, association and privacy. 
203 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, however the rights issued in 
this Convention are different than civil and political rights as they are to be realized and worked towards by the host 
governments, whereas civil and political rights are more or less non-negotiable. The primary economic social and 
cultural right found in refugee cases in the issues of ‘discrimination’ 
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restrict the refugee concept as hitherto understood.”204 Perhaps the debate is simply a game of 
semantics, a pointless exercise into the ‘true meaning’ of a word, especially as Weis, who was 
present at the drafting of the Convention has stated, “[a]s one who participated in the drafting of 
the convention, I can say that the drafters did not have specific restrictions in mind when they 
used this terminology. Theirs was an effort to express in legal terms what is generally considered 
a political refugee.”205
Persecution, regardless of what it means, must be proven to be real, which is done 
through the notion of having ‘well-founded fear.’ In discussing the concept of well-founded fear, 
Weiss summarizes the viewpoint of Grahl-Madsen, stating that “the adjective 'well-founded' 
connoted a fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution . . . this term suggests that it is not 
the frame of mind of the person concerned which is decisive for her or his claim to refugee 
status, but that this claim should be measured with a more objective yardstick.”
 This is probably the case as ‘political refugees’ were the refugees that the 
1951 Convention was written for.  
206 This 
‘yardstick’ measures elements such as fear, understood as a “forward-looking expectation of 
risk”, and “[o]nce fear so conceived is voiced by the act of seeking protection, it falls to the state 
party assessing refugee status to determine whether that expectation is borne out by the actual 
circumstances of the case.”207  Fear is then evaluated as to whether or not it is valid, or ‘well-
founded’, through looking at “all forms of material evidence” (i.e. news media, human rights 
reports, and other available and reliable country information), as well as personal testimony from 
the individual, if it is found to be credible.208
                                                             
204 Jackson, “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 406. 
 There have also been substantial court cases in 
205Dr. Weis, quoted in Jackson, “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 406; this quote also 
demonstrates Weis’ opinion that persecution includes things that are of a political nature, not general human rights 
violations, as indicated in the above note 62.  
206 Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Volume 1, 173, summarized in Weiss, “The 
Travaux Préparatoires Analyzed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis,” 7. 
207 “The Michigan Guidelines of Well-Founded Fear,” Third Colloquium on Challenges in International 
Refugee Law, The Program in Refugee and Asylum Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, March 26-28, 2004), http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/documents/Well-Founded_Fear.pdf (accessed 
March 1, 2012). The Michigan Guidelines are the product of a colloquium meeting of lawyers, academics and policy 
workers in the field of refugee studies, in order to “develop the intellectual framework for resolution of cutting-edge 
problems facing international refugee law.” For more information on the Michigan Guidelines, including guidelines 
on other refugee-related issues, see http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/pral/Pages/guidelines.aspx.  
208 “The Michigan Guidelines of Well-Founded Fear.”  
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several countries that have shaped and structured how the concept of a well-founded fear of 
persecution is tested and tried.209
This attention to every detail of the definition, more particularly to this short phrase, 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted,” may also indicate that the definition does 
not work for all groups of refugees, particularly modern refugee flows. Every part of the 
definition is manipulated and reconfigured, including how a well–founded fear of persecution 
relates to the five grounds of persecution: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social groups, and political opinion.
  
210
Perhaps it was the intention of the drafters to leave the definition of a refugee, and the 
terminology used ambiguous, in order to maximize its breadth. However, its effect today has 
been the opposite, as many governments, particularly in the global north utilize this ambiguity to 
apply the convention definition restrictively. RSD procedures and the application of the 
convention definition are now caught up in a legal formalism, that have “fallen prey to an 
emphasis on legal abstraction, often in disregard of the reality that exists in the asylum seeker's 
country of origin . . . [t]he asylum seeker's personal reality, crucial in refugee status 
determination, is under-emphasized . . . [and] one dangerous consequence is that determination 
systems become vulnerable to politicization.”
 
211 Rather than the humanitarian aims of the 
definition, and for that matter the Convention, facts are now the key to protection, rather than 
need or fear of the person seeking said protection. This is not to say that facts are not useful, but 
in many asylum cases, facts are difficult to prove.  According to Barsky, the purpose of 
contemporary RSD hearings is to212
narrow the refugee claimant down to the stated grounds for his/her claim so that a 
decision can be made on the case, so the legal grill or template which is applied to 
evaluate the legitimacy (the kind of persecution suffered) is limited in such a way that 
 
                                                             
209 In the US case, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the 
US court set a precedent that asylum claims need to demonstrate “reasonable likelihood” of persecution if returned 
home, as opposed to withholding deportation which requires a higher burden of proof. In case Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, decided that state complicity in persecution was not required in order to 
receive asylum, as the state was ‘unwilling or unable’ to protect him, and thus it amounted to persecution. In the 
Australian case, Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379 F.C. 
89/034, the court held that an asylum seeker must have a "real chance” (substantial chance, high probability) of 
facing persecution if returned to their country of origin. 
210For an overview of the five grounds for claiming refugee status and relevant court cases see Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 70-89; Hathaway, Chapter 5, “Nexus to Civil and Political 
Status,” in The Law of Refugee Status, 135-188. 
211 Arboleda and Hoy, “The Convention Refugee Definition in the West,” 83. 
212 Robert F. Barsky, Constructing a Productive Other: Discourse Theory and the Convention Refugee 
Hearing (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1994), 4. 
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it produces a narrative which speaks of a very small and extremely problematic 
segment of the refugee’s experience. 
 
The legal sphere in which RSD hearings are heard creates a space in which a decision is 
made on limited facts, sometimes separated from the larger picture or produces a picture 
victimization which is dehumanizing (as will be discussed further later in the thesis), but is often 
central to either receiving protection or being rejected. 
Barsky’s central argument is that in order to be successful in obtaining refugee status the 
person must match their description of events as closely as possible to what the legal authorities 
deem to be admissible; a claimants hearing “will be successful to the degree that he is able to 
create an Other213 (as Convention refugee) that is productive within the context to which he is 
speaking.”214 Essentially, persons wishing to seek asylum must make their claim fit within the 
definition found in the 1951 Convention, constructing a narrative that fits pre-set criteria based 
on facts. The problematic issue associated with the “policy of haggling over tiny details with 
dramatically persecuted persons . . . is that the veracity of the entire claim is put into question by 
ultimately inconsequential (but verifiable) details.”215 As a result of this fact-finding tactic, 
“decision-makers often fail to link the purely structural legal criteria with the level of 
background and information necessary to allow these concepts to acquire a relevant content,”216 
essentially making it more difficult to have a neutral decision. Although Barsky wrote 
specifically of the Canadian system, his analysis rings true for many of the systems in global 
north. The systems in place attempt to formalize and make the subjective objective, while often 
ignoring the perceptual differences between the applicant and decision-makers. Barsky explains 
it best, stating that,217
[r]efugee hearings are a peculiar hybrid of courtroom-style interrogation, loosely structured story-
telling, and inter-cultural discussions involving bureaucrats (who rarely exhibit an understanding 
of the Third World countries from which most refugees come) and claimants (who generally 
exhibit as little understanding of the host country as the bureaucrats do of the country of origin). 
 
 
                                                             
213 For Barsky, the ‘Other’ moves beyond the typical notion of generalized stranger or foreigner. As a 
‘productive Other,’ this involves “culturally-imposed confines that hinder or bind the refugee as constructed Other;’ 
the process in making a claim then is one of “creating a ‘productive other,’ a satisfactory stand-in for the purposes of 
the hearing.” In other words, this ‘Other’ must be created in order to fit into the appropriate refugee definition, and it 
is ‘productive’ in that the process is one of self-representation for a clearly defined end. 
214 Barsky, Constructing a Productive Other, 19.  
215. Ibid., 149. 
216 Arboleda and Hoy, “The Convention Refugee Definition in the West,” 83. 
217 Barsky, Constructing a Productive Other, 65. 
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As national governments in the global north handle the refugee processing independent 
from UNHCR, labels that are created and given may represent a wider political agenda, which in 
contemporary times is aimed at limiting entry to undesirable foreigners or meeting ulterior 
political and policy motives. Arboleda and Hoy argue that in order to truly abide by the 1951 
Convention refugee definition, states, particularly northern states, must agree on “standards for 
fair, predictable and effective refugee determination systems” which is contingent on a clear 
refugee definition and interpretation.218 Rather than being driven by legal and political desires, 
RSD procedures should be reformulated outside of the legal formalism that is has been built 
around, as well as the issue that concern for the numbers associated with recognition rates tends 
to trump the need for consistent and fair application and implementation of the 1951 
Convention.219
Making Refugee Protection Meaningful 
 
Although states freely sign the 1951 Convention, the discussion about reformulating 
refugee policies is taking place because states see the current policies as “insufficiently attentive 
to their sovereign right to exclude aliens.” 220 For other groups working in refugee aid and 
advocacy, the current refugee definition is seen as limiting and too restrictive to account for all 
those who should benefit from protection.221
 
 Refugee law is in crisis as most interested parties, 
despite their disparate interests, agree that the international refugee law system as it exists today 
is problematic and needs reform. Several academics have suggested ways in which refugee law 
should be reframed or readdressed to better protect refugees, which are reviewed below.  
Reform through Human Rights  
Hathaway suggests that refugee law should be reassessed in terms of human rights 
protection.222
                                                             
218 Arboleda and Hoy, “The Convention Refugee Definition in the West,” 67. 
 The current refugee definition found in article 1 of the 1951 Convention, in the 
view of Hathaway, is limiting as these grounds are not adequate enough to encompass all those 
219 Ibid., 84. 
220 Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 115. 
221 Pécoud and  de Guchteneire, “Migration Without Borders,”19-20. 
222 See the following articles by Hathaway:, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,”  
113-31; “Why Refugee Law Still Matters,” 89-103; and James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, “Making 
International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal For Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997): 115-211. 
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who require protection because they have been forced to migrate. This author asserts that the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention “intentionally left the meaning of ‘persecution’ undefined 
because they realized the impossibility of enumerating in advance all of the forms of 
maltreatment” which might legitimate a person’s claim to foreign protection.223 Hathaway 
suggests that fear of persecution can remain a meaningful concept if reinterpreted more towards 
the failure of basic state protection, demonstrated through the denial of fundamental, 
internationally recognized human rights, and that “any person whose basic human dignity is at 
risk in her home state must be empowered to leave the abusive situation. Refugee law should be 
an effective means of enabling persons to disengage from states which have forfeited their claim 
to international legitimacy by failure to adhere to basic standards of human rights law.”224
In this human rights model, persecution is seen as failure of state protection. This is 
similar to Shacknove, who states that “persecution is but one manifestation of a broader 
phenomenon: the absence of state protection of the citizen's basic needs.”
 
225  For Hathaway, the 
conceptual weakness of the 1951 Convention definition is the requirement that the well-founded 
fear of persecution be derived from reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion.226
The 1951 Convention does grant certain rights to refugees that are articulated in other 
human rights instruments including freedom of religion,
 Hathaway goes into more detail regarding the 
fundamental concepts in this reformulation, including the problem areas, specifically the issue of 
the willingness of states to broaden the current parameters for defining a refugee, as that would 
create a higher rate of “Convention refugees” in the state, which is not something that most states 
would deem as desirable. 
227 non-discrimination,228 freedom of 
association,229 freedom of movement,230 employment and labor rights,231 as well as the 
obligation of states to issue identity papers and travel documents232
                                                             
223 Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 122. 
 and facilitate assimilation 
224 Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 120. 
225 Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?,” 277. 
226 Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 123. 
227 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Article 4. 
228 Ibid., Article 3. 
229 Ibid., Article 15. 
230 Ibid., Article 26. 
231 Ibid., Articles 17-19. 
232 Ibid., Articles 27-28. 
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and naturalization.233 Re-emphasizing the human rights side of the 1951 Convention and of 
refugee protection is important in preventing refugee law and RSD procedures from becoming 
over-legalized or buried within immigration procedures and policies, as was discussed earlier. 
Thus, drawing attention to the human rights roots of the 1951 Convention has the potential, 
according to some academics, to make refugee protection more meaningful, without changing 
the actual text of the Convention.234
 
 
 Reforming through communication and burden sharing 
Garvey suggests that in order for the refugee system to be relevant and effective, it must 
rest on inter-state accountability,235 creating a “binding regime of international burden-
sharing.”236  Unlike Hathaway, Garvey does not see human rights as the best option to better 
protect refugees, although he recognizes that “refugee crises are naturally infused with the 
rhetoric of human rights,” he believes that “human rights principles embody ends, not means,” 
rather today’s refugee crisis must address state-to-state relations.237 In Garvey’s view, refugee 
law “reaches a dead end” as human rights law because it clashes with the principle of national 
sovereignty, and the misuse of human rights law “as the exclusive legal basis for dealing with 
mass exodus leads only to unproductive rhetoric and recrimination.”238
On the other hand, Chimni’s reform represents the view of the global south. Chimni 
believes that a fundamental issue in international refugee law and policy today is that laws and 
policies have been predominantly drafted and shaped by states and scholars from the global 
north, without consultation with governments and scholars of the global south and, most 
significantly, silencing the voices of refugees themselves.
 Generally speaking, 
human rights law is consistently compromised because the principle of national sovereignty in 
international law gives states exclusive control over the individuals within its territory. 
239
                                                             
233 Ibid., Article 34. 
 Likewise, UNHCR has moved away 
234 Alice Edwards, “Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right 'to Enjoy' Asylum,” International Journal of 
Refugee Law 17, no. 2 (2005): 328-30. Edwards’ , main argument is that ”[i]n the face of eroding standards of 
treatment for refugees and asylum seekers,[international human rights law] serves to reinforce refugee protection 
and to define and give meaning to the ‘right to enjoy asylum’ component of Article 14 of the UDHR.” 
235Garvey, “Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law,” 494-499 
236 Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 120. 
237 Garvey, “Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law,” 500. 
238 Ibid., 487. 
239 B.S. Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model,” Harvard International 
Law Journal 12, no. 2 (2001): 151-68. 
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from its past positions on important issues, such as voluntary repatriation, and involved itself 
more with internally displaced persons without “entering into a sustained dialogue” with states 
and scholars in the global south or southern NGOs.240 The unilateralism of the global north and 
UNHCR has had a profoundly negative impact on refugee protection. To improve refugee 
protection, Chimni suggests a “dialogic model” that proposes communication “on a continuous 
and institutionalized basis between States, the civil society and UNHCR, within UNHCR, and 
between concerned NGOs and governments.”241
Chimni argues that the refugee regime today, with UNHCR at the fore, has moved 
towards the policy of containment, through which they encourage regional containment of 
refugees (such as in neighboring countries) and repatriation, over resettlement or movement to 
the global north.
 Opening a stronger dialogue between the 
various elements of the emerging transnational society, there is potential, according to Chimni, to 
safeguard core protection principles for refugees. Chimni’s reforms and ideas are rooted in the 
social inequalities between the global north and south, representing one of the few reforms that 
emphasize the effects the current state of global inequality has on refugee protection, which will 
be discussed further in the following Part III.  
242 Voluntary repatriation is seen as the ideal solution, and has been 
identification as the humane solution, often leading to its pursuit even when it is not appropriate 
(i.e. without full research of safety and security in the country of origin) or indeed voluntary.243 
Chimni also articulates the changing role of UNHCR within refugee policies in the global north, 
specifically how they have coped with the fact that refugees are no longer welcome in the global 
north. The northern states are the largest donors to UNHCR, and the UNHCR mandate and 
policies have been adjusted, showing that “UNHCR is an uncritical consumer of concepts and 
theories which support a particular (northern) vision of the global refugee order.”244
                                                             
240 Ibid., 151. 
 As UNHCR 
is arguably the ‘guardian’ of refugee law and policy, their seeming alliance with the global north 
by remaining silent, or at least not openly criticizing, the way in which policy is implemented in 
these countries can be very problematic. The dependence that UNHCR has on donations from 
the states in the global north also shows the limitations of the organization’s sphere of influence 
and ability to influence policy in the north.   
241 Ibid. 
242 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies.” 
243 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies.” 
244 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 364. 
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The majority of refugee movement (flight and asylum) takes place in states located in the 
global south, and many states in the global north are working to keep that movement contained 
in the south and away from their countries’ borders. With this reality in place, as well as the shift 
of UNHCR’s policies, as discussed above, reformulations on how ‘burden sharing’ and resource 
allocation can be better distributed have emerged. Kritzman-Amir addresses the issue of burden 
sharing by asking the question “when refugees leave their country of nationality, which country 
is responsible for protecting and providing for them?”245
Kritzman-Amir proposes several mechanisms for burden-sharing, all of which are 
connected to a state’s moral obligation to assist. Refugee protection is expensive, as it requires 
countries to allocate resources to meet the basic needs of refugees, which is something that many 
countries in the global south do not have. In the opinion of Kritzman-Amir, there is “no moral 
justification for these costs to be disproportionately borne by some countries and not others,” 
however there are not incentives for states to create fair responsibility-sharing mechanisms, 
which is primarily the result of the lack of political influence that many of the refugee hosting 
countries in the global south.
 For many refugees coming from the 
global south, they first seek refuge in a neighboring country, which is not likely to provide them 
functional protection, and the ability to exercise their human rights and the reality is that only a 
small percentage of refugees are able to reach countries that have the resources to provide them 
with adequate protection.  
246
Hathaway and Neve produced another reformulation of refugee law that proposes a 
“solution oriented protection” that is based in a human rights framework. Rather than addressing 
or reformulating the status quo of the refugee regime, recognizing that states will not adhere to 
policies that will potentially increase migration into their countries, they propose ways in which 
better protection can be realized in regional protection schemes.
 Overall, this article addresses an important sub-issue in many of 
the other proposals to reformulate how refugee issues are addressed by host countries, drawing 
out the disconnect between the global north and south, specifically regarding resources. 
247
                                                             
245 Tally Kritzman-Amir, “Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in Refugee 
Law,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (2009): 355-94. 
  Recognizing that refugee 
status is intended to be a temporary status, not a “back door to permanent immigration,” this 
proposal also advocates for temporary protection, as it is “concerned to safeguard human dignity 
246 Tally Kritzman-Amir, “Not in My Backyard,” 392. 
247 Hathaway and Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again,” 207. 
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only until and unless the home state is able to effectively resume its primary duty of protection,” 
therefore if temporary protection is conceived in a “rights-regarding and solution-oriented 
manner” refugees will be able to return home when it is appropriate.248
Hathaway and Neve’s proposal also rests on enhanced burden sharing between states, and 
the “duty to equitably share the responsibilities and burdens of refugee protection.”
   
249 Under this 
proposed “regime of common responsibility,” certain countries (what is called the “interest-
convergence” group) agree in advance to contribute to protect refugees who arrive to the territory 
of any of the member states.250 The idea behind this ‘interest-convergence group’ is to 
disassociate the site of arrival from the country of asylum. The idea is that if the protection 
mechanisms in the global south are strengthened, the global north will have a significant 
reduction in asylum claims, particularly fraudulent asylum claims, and would be able to 
dismantle some of the ‘non-entrée’ mechanisms. The savings from the reduction of money spent 
on asylum claims could then be directed to the protection of refugees in the global south.251
However this ‘solution-oriented’ proposal has some essential flaws, which have been 
discussed by Chimni, Anker, Fitzpatrick, and Shacknove. 
 In 
other words, the global north has the resources for better protection and the south as the capacity 
(in regards to the regional proximity to the refugee flows) to absorb the refugees. 
252 Of particular concern is the 
emphasis on regional protection. By advocating for regional protection and reducing the amount 
of asylum claims in the global north, this system allows the states of the global north use the 
structural inequalities between the north and south, which they have constructed and sustained, 
to their advantage;253 the north is able to reduce asylum claims and responsibility to protect 
refugees on their territory. Also, the regional protection proposed by Hathaway is dependent on 
consistent funds from states in the global north. However, once the refugees are contained in a 
regional protection framework, it is not likely that the states in the global north will feel as 
compelled to fund the operations.254
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 The conception of burden sharing, or the “refugee-resource 
transaction” in this proposal “turns the refugee into a commodity which can be 'traded' on the 
249 Ibid., 211. 
250 Ibid., 145. 
251 Ibid., 145-149. 
252 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 358-60; Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick, and Andrew 
Shacknove, “Crisis and Cure,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 11 (1998): 295-310. 
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world market,”255 removing the asylum seeker from the sphere of law. The additional fear is that 
the emphasis on temporary protection in poorer countries of the global south will erode the 
human rights and welfare standards in the 1951 Convention rather than strengthen them.256 In 
general, this model moves away from the core of the Convention, which is the right to personal 
protection and to regain human dignity, as it “suppresses the moral individuality of forced 
migrants,” which has “moral costs.”257
 
 
Moral and Humanitarian Arguments 
The moral, humanitarian argument for refugee protection is something that can be seen in 
many proposals (as indicated above) for bettering refugee protection. Most governments will in 
fact acknowledge the importance of refugee protection, but they do not want it happening on 
their soil. Gibney articulated this disjunction in his book, stating that  
a kind of schizophrenia seems to pervade Western responses to asylum seekers and refugees; 
great importance is attached to the principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure 
that refugees (and others with less pressing claims) never reach the territory of the state where 
they could receive protection.258
 
 
This excerpt suggests that the recognition for the need and purpose of asylum is one 
shared by most states, and suggests that it is possible to base a reformulation of refugee law on 
this shared moral value. All of the above suggestions for readdressing refugee law and policy rest 
primarily on increased burden-sharing and communication among states, and Gibney’s book, 
The Ethics and Politics of Asylum adds to this literature by grounding this reformulation in the 
ethical, primarily utilizing the idea of ‘humanitarianism,’ and interacting with issue of what 
duties states have towards refugees. Gibney suggests that the principle of humanitarianism in 
relation to refugee protection, holds that “states have an obligation to assist refugees when the 
costs of doing so are low,” understanding ‘low costs’ as “a way of keeping the sacrifices required 
of citizens at a minimum to reduce the likelihood of backlash.”259
                                                             
255 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 362. 
 This is a simplified description 
of Gibney’s ideas, however the basic claim is clear, which is that this approach will better 
256 Anker, Fitzpatrick, and Shacknove, “Crisis and Cure,” 302. 
257 Ibid., 306. 
258 Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. 
259 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics If Asylum,231. 
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realistically call on states to uphold this ‘moral duty,’ as it is flexible enough to be applied 
differently from state to state. Gibney sees the flaws in this idea, as calling upon 
humanitarianism will not account for the other political realities that compromise and shape this 
ethical responsibility, however he believes that  “the humanitarian principle might move these 
states closer to realizing the values they claim to live by now.”260
Is it enough? 
 However, this idea has the 
potential to suffer similar criticism as Hathaway and Neve, as the as obligation to protect is put 
in terms of cost and benefit, and moves away from legal responsibilities, as well as removing the 
refugee from law. 
Many of these reforms and critiques, aside from Chimni, neglect the externalist 
component of refuge protection or, in other words, they have neglected to place the responsibility 
that the global north has in creating conditions that generate refugee flows. The externalist 
explanation assigns “blame between the state from which refugees flee and states responsible for 
authoring policies or undertaking action leading to the outflow of refugees.”261 The focus on the 
internal cause of refugee flows and forced migration creates a lack of international accountability 
and a system in which “prevention is preferable to cure.”262
Many of the proposals for reformulating refugee protection are in line with the idea of the 
“Convention Plus” approach adopted by UNHCR. This initiative acknowledges that, although 
important in defining state responsibilities to refugees, the 1951 Convention “cannot address all 
the pressing issues pertaining to refugee protection in today’s changing world.”
 The methods of ‘prevention,’ namely 
human rights and humanitarianism, are problematic in reaffirming a focus on internal causes of 
refugee production, among other problems, which will be discussed in Part III. 
263 The 
Convention Plus agreement includes multilateral special agreements, targeting development 
assistance,264
                                                             
260 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics If Asylum,260. 
 among other things, but with focus on enhancing protection without any suggestion 
of altering the initial Convention.  However, as most of these reforms are created and proposed 
261 Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 261. 
262 Ibid. 
263 “Convention Plus at a Glance,” 2005, http://www.unhcr.org/403b30684.pdf (accessed February 20, 
2011). 
264 For more information on these development assistance initiatives, see Alexander Betts, “International 
Cooperation between North and South to Enhance Refugee Protection in Regions of Origin,” Refugee Studies 
Center Working Paper no. 25 (July 2005). 
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without making a change to the Convention, will the call to reignite the moral force of human 
rights law create actual change? Rees suggests that “the moral force of refugee policy varies with 
the extent to which we identify with the refugee.”265
Most of the aforementioned attempts to re-formulate law have all done so under the 
premise of working within the current system, which is the same system that much of this 
literature also indicates is failing. Using the key elements that these important academics have 
constructed will be a starting point to analyze a realistic and rational system of refugee 
protection, which might include starting over and responding to the contemporary situation, 
rather than remaining tied to the specific historical event that the 1951 Convention is grounded 
in. The above existing critique is an important starting point from which I articulate my own 
critique of current policies and suggested directions of reform in order to continue to usefully 
rethink how refugee protection can best protect the vulnerable .  
  As discussed in the outset of this Part, the 
characteristics of the current asylum-seeking population that enter the global north are often 
culturally different from the host society, and if the populations of the global north do not 
identify with asylum-seekers, then the law and Convention, as it stands today, will not acquire a 
strong moral force. 
PART III: FORCED MIGRATION IN CONTEXT 
 
In Part II and II of this paper we have seen how the refugee was created in international 
law, the critiques and problems associated with the current approach to refugee law, and the 
global north’s role in international refugee policy. This section aims to discuss the situation of 
forced displacement in the context of global inequalities, via globalization, and the un-productive 
discourse that refugee protection is mired in. Refugees have indeed become an issue of the global 
south, as this is the location of the vast majority of refugee production and protection programs. 
Just as ‘genuine’ refugees have become more difficult and complex to identify, so have the 
causes of their displacement. What seems to be evident is that forced migration has the potential 
to become yet another “part of a western project of global dominance” operating under the 
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banner of globalization.266
Issues of Definition 
 Part III will finish with the argument that international refugee law 
has become irrelevant and an irrational system of protection in contemporary society and suggest 
ways in which this issue must be rethought. 
In the early years when the first treaties pertaining to refugee protection were developed, 
and international efforts were coordinated for relief, an ad hoc approach was taken to classifying 
certain migrants as ‘refugees.’ The definition evolved and new conventions were created that 
reflected the needs of the displaced populations specific to their circumstances, or in many cases 
their geographic origin.267
The post-World War II refugee definition was formulated during a period of global 
divide between the capitalist West and the communist East. Under this backdrop, refugees were 
conceptualized by the drafters of the 1951 Convention as a product of a certain kind of political 
rule, namely “oppressive, totalitarian regimes,” such as that which existed in Nazi Germany or 
the states that were forming in the communist Central and Eastern Europe.
 From the progression that was outlined in Part I, the argument can be 
made that the definition of a refugee was not rigid, but rather a fluid category that reflected the 
prevailing realities of displacement, as well as the perceived protection needs of that time period.  
268 In this dichotomy, 
the political undertone of the Convention suggests that all communist countries were repressive, 
and that Western states were the only place of sanctuary for such asylum seekers.269
Although sixty years have passed since, the 1951 Convention has remained largely 
unchanged. The only major change was the addition of the 1967 Protocol, which removed the 
temporal and geographic limitations of the refugee definition, effectively making the law 
universal. However, the world has shifted dramatically since 1967 and the refugee definition, 
As European 
refugee movement in this period was rooted in this divide, stateless persons and refugees 
produced as a result of repressive communist regimes were welcomed in the democratic states of 
the West. 
                                                             
266 B.S. Chimni, “The Birth of a ‘Discipline': From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 22, no. 1 (2009): 20. 
267 Isabelle R. Gunning, “Expanding the International Definition of Refugee,” Fordham International Law 
Journal 13, no. 50 (1989-1990): 40. 
268 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum,6; The discussion in Part I also discusses how the refugee 
definition found in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention is clearly aligned with those fleeing the Nazi regime and the 
Soviet Union. 
269 Giorgio Grappi, “Refugees and Partition in a Migrants' World,” Refugee Watch no. 35 (June 2010): 67 
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based on alienage and an individual claim to a well-founded fear of persecution based on reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, is 
irrelevant for much of the forced migration occurring in the twenty-first century. In this Part the 
term ‘forced migrant’ will be used in place of ‘refugee’ because the reality is that most displaced 
persons are not refugees, in the legal sense, as they do not fall into the categories of the 1951 
Convention or in the extended definitions of the regional  definitions found in the African and 
Latin American systems. Even the term ‘forced migrant’ can be a problematic as what really 
constitutes force is an important question: does force imply physical violence, or is poverty, 
unemployment and lack of state welfare a reasonable conditions to constitute force? The latter is 
a push factor for much of the domestic and international migration in the global south, however, 
if they are not threatened for convention reasons, they are not refugees and not entitled to 
international protection. It is clear that it is time to reassess the international refugee regime so 
that it can more rationally protect vulnerable migrants. Today’s causes of migration transcend 
simple categories such as political opinion or religious belief, but have their source in entrenched 
and increasing global social and economic inequalities.   
 
A Southern Issue?  
The global refugee population peaked after the Cold War with 18.2 million at the end of 
1993.270 Since then, the number of recognized refugees has fluctuated, but has not reached this 
peak thus far. At the end of 2010, UNHCR estimated that the global refugee population to be 
10.55 million persons.271 The vast majority of these refugees originate in the global south, and 
the enhanced border security and immigration procedures in the global north, as well as the 
policy of containment implemented by UNHCR, have kept 80% of the world’s refugees (8.5 
million persons) in the global south.272
                                                             
270 See Stephen Castles, “Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration,” Sociology 77, no. 1 (2003): 14. 
 When looking at the figures, one might deduce that 
refugees are not a northern issue, as the majority of refugees are produced in and remain in the 
global south.  
271 This includes 597,300 persons UNHCR considers to be in ‘refugee-like’ situations, and does not include 
the some 4.8 million Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations Works and Relief 
Agency. See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, 10th ed. (UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, December 207, 2011), 6, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f06ecf72.html 
(accessed March 2, 2012).  
272 Ibid.  
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The aforementioned numbers only take into account those who have been recognized 
under the 1951 Convention as refugees, and do not accurately capture the present reality of 
forced migration in the global south. In fact, refugees are part of a larger, increasingly complex 
phenomenon of forced migration. In addition to the grounds outlined in the1951 Convention, 
persons are forced to migrate for a number of reasons including generalized violence, war and 
conflict, natural and man-made disasters, and as a result of unequal development trajectories. 
Although northern states have remained firm on not expanding the definition, as it is believed to 
broad enough for those who need protection (as discussed in Part II), the states in what is now 
the global south have embraced more inclusive definitions for the protection of forced migrants. 
 
Regional Definitions 
The refugee was created out of a certain global dichotomy between the East and West. 
The 1951 Convention largely did not reflect the reality of forced migration and displacement in 
the Third World that was occurring during the same time period, as it was an instrument created 
for European displacement. While the First and Second World countries were engaged in the 
Cold War, much of the non-aligned Third World was experiencing large amounts of forced 
displacement, particularly on the African Continent and it was soon clear that the refugee 
problem was not limited to Europe. As previously discussed, the 1967 Protocol was adopted, 
removing the temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951 Convention, so that the 
protections offered in the Convention can be utilized in the rest of the world. However, as soon 
as the concept of refugee was placed within the confines of the 1951 Convention, the definition 
proved to be inadequate for many countries of the global south, where issues of forced migration 
manifested differently. Soon after this definition was adopted, it needed to be changed.273
In the 1960s, many states on the African continent had either recently decolonized, or 
were in the process of doing so. This struggle for independence and decolonization, as well as 
the process of conforming to colonially drawn borders and types of government and statehood,
 
274
                                                             
273 David Turton, “Conceptualizing Forced Migration,” University of Oxford Refugee Studies Center 
Working Paper Series no. 12 (October 2003): 13. 
 
274 The legal doctrine of uti possidetis juris, related to the process of decolonization, means that the new 
states must maintain the same borders that were established by the colonial powers. However, as colonial borders 
were drawn without regard for pre-colonial indigenous political structures, or ethnic or cultural divisions among 
peoples, this policy made it difficult for post-colonial states to assert their unity. See Anghie, Chapter 4 
“Sovereignty and the Post-Colonial State,” in Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 196-
244. 
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led to population displacement that was different from the five grounds listed in the 1951 
Convention. In 1969 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.275
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of origin or nationality.
 In addition to the 1951 
Convention definition, the OAU Convention included as a refugee: 
276
 
 
In 1984, the Latin American states created a similar definition in the Cartagena Declaration on 
refugees.277 This declaration was made in response to the large number of persons displaced as a 
result of the political and military upheavals in Latin America during the late 1970s and 
1980s.278
The 1951 Convention and the regional definitions reflect different historical contexts, as 
one was a response to European totalitarianism, and the other to the realities of the struggle for 
independence, the dilemmas of the postcolonial state with artificially imposed borders and forms 
of governance, political turmoil, and generalized violence. These definitions encompass the 
individual-based persecution of the 1951 Convention, as well as groups who were fleeing from 
generalized violence and civil strife. The intent of this Convention was to create a regional 
definition of refugee. However, the OAU Convention in particular was also farsighted about the 
world’s future challenges when it came to forced migration.
 
279
                                                             
275 Organization of African Unity, “Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa,” 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (September 10, 1969), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36018.html (accessed 
January, 3 2012). 
 In addition to the inclusiveness of 
this definition, the OAU Convention also challenges the notion that individual persecution is an 
276 Ibid., Article 1(2) 
277“Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,” Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in 
Central America, Mexico and Panama, (22 November 1984),http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html 
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278 Ibid.; see pages 187-209 for a more comprehensive analysis of the conditions that led to this declaration. 
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essential criterion of refugeehood as “the normal bond between the citizen and the state can be 
severed in diverse ways, persecution being but one.“280
The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration were both created to meet regional 
needs and respond to logical considerations, namely the inability to handle large waves of 
displaced persons on an individual, case-by-case basis.
 
281
 
  Today, while some of the causes of 
migration and displacement continues to result from political persecution (as included in the 
1951 Convention definition), generalized violence and civil strife (as included in the OAU and 
Cartagena definitions), other causes are increasingly prevalent that do not fit into existing 
international or regional legal categories. 
Internally Displaced Persons 
One of the most striking issues related to forced migration today is the amount of internal 
displacement. At the end of 2010, UNHCR had 33.9 million persons under its protection 
mandate, of which only 10.55 million (approximately 31%) were Convention refugees.282 The 
largest population that UNHCR offers protection to is Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 
amounting to 14.7 million persons (approximately 43%).283 A refugee, as discussed previously, 
must be outside the territory of their home state, an element which IDPs lack. In the view of 
UNHCR, IDPs have undergone similar experiences as Convention refugees, the only difference 
being that they have not crossed an international border and thus are not considered a refugee in 
the legal sense.284 An IDP is not just any person displaced within their home country. There are 
specific parameters for this status, similar to gaining refugee status.  Although only 14.7 million 
IDPs receive attention from UNHCR, they estimate that there are approximately 27 million IDPs 
around the world.285
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Unlike refugees, there is no legal definition for IDPs.286
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
 The general definition in the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement includes: 
287
 
 
The inclusion of IDPs under the mandate of the UNHCR is an insight into the weaknesses and 
limitations of the 1951 Convention: that many people made vulnerable through forced 
displacement do not fall under its definition. IDPs are included in the protection scheme of 
UNHCR and other organizations, which construct camps and distribute aid to the best of their 
ability and available resources. However, there is no clear and stable internationally-mandated 
legal responsibility or protection regime for IDPs as they have not crossed an international 
border.288
Prior to the adoption of the 1951 Convention, there was no agreement that a refugee 
necessarily had to be outside their country of origin.
 They fall under the legal responsibility of their home state. Thus, to some extent, 
providing internal protection for those suffering as a result of war and conflict prevents them 
from seeking legally secure, stable, long-term asylum outside their home country as is their legal 
right.  
289 However, as the Convention was written 
during the emergence of the Cold War, this necessity for border crossing makes sense, as the 
“crossing of the ‘Iron Curtain’ was considered to be of critical importance” and it was unlikely 
that the communist control in the Soviet Union was to produce internal displacement.290 
Although this division is no longer present, many authorities in the field of refugee studies 
believe that alienage is paramount to providing persons with international protection,291
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 and with 
the current legal framework of international refugee law, this is true. As it stands, those who are 
287 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,(July 22, 1998):1, 
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in similar circumstances to refugees, but have not crossed an international border have had their 
bond and relationship with the state severed, but have no new sovereign to depend on. Refugee 
law is premised on the idea of host states/states of asylum providing surrogate state protection 
where the state of nationality has failed.292
The New Context of Displacement 
 However, in the case of IDPs, their basic rights 
remain dependent on the ability and resources of UNHCR or some other humanitarian 
organization. 
The dominant discourses of our era privilege globalization and human rights, operate 
under the assumption that democratic rule is the norm. Regardless of the reality, most states 
claim to be democratic or at least moving towards democratization. As democracy and human 
rights have become the global norm,293 the ideological battle of the Cold War that gave refugee 
status its political charge and significance is no longer present. In this ‘new world order’ the 
West is now the global north, and the ‘enemy’ is no longer as easily defined, making refugees 
less politically and ideologically significant.294 Refugees are no longer being produced by 
“defunct and defeated regimes,”295 but come from sovereign and sometimes democratic 
nations.296
 
  
The ‘New World Order’  
The ‘political refugee’ was the dominant character in forced migration for much of the 
twentieth century, constructed through an important global political and social paradigm for 
much of that century.297
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 Today the ‘humanitarian refugee’ fleeing the destitute global south has 
replaced the political refugee.  
293 For discussions on this idea see Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at 
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With the end of the Cold War the world embarked on a “new world order”, in which the 
world was no longer divided by ideology, and was united by law and democracy.298 The intrinsic 
ideas of this new era were expressed by then President George HW Bush in his speech to 
Congress on March 7, 1991:299
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided, a world of barbed wire and concrete 
block, conflict and cold war. And now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in 
which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 
"world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the 
strong." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the 
historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a 
home among all nations. 
  
 
The reality is that this new world order has ushered in a new global divide, not between the West 
and the East, but the north and south. Rather than a geographical separation, this is a social 
divide300 and an expression of the current state of global inequality.301
These inequalities are exacerbated by the process of globalization, which is the post-
communist era’s universal ideology of progress.
 Since many of the 
countries of the global south became independent sovereign states, predominantly through the 
process of decolonization, they have not reached the prosperity of the global north, as many 
regions of the global south are plagued by the legacy of slavery, colonization, economic 
exploitation and underdevelopment, internal conflict, and generally a lower realization of basic 
human rights. 
302 In an economic context, globalization is often 
used analogously with free trade, referring to “the reduction and removal of barriers between 
national borders in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services and labor,”303
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However, as international law and organizations have moved towards regimes for free movement 
of goods, capital, and services,304 there is no such regime for the free movement of labor. In fact, 
migration has become more restrictive than in the past, as witnessed in the phenomenon of 
‘fortress Europe,’ as mentioned in Part II.305
Globalization, however, is not a neutral process and does not affect all equally: “some 
may prosper and others will be left behind…those who sit at the top of social and economic 
hierarchies, both countries and individuals, are more likely to see gains from globalization.”
 
306
 
 
The reality is that the countries that constitute the global south entered at the bottom of the social 
and economic hierarchies, and have struggled to move out of this position, resulting in uneven 
progress and an increased divide between the global north and south. 
New players in displacement   
The increasing amount of forced migration has not happened in a vacuum. There are 
other socio-economic conditions that create the ‘root causes’ of displacement. These conditions 
provide the impetus to move or conditions in which forced displacement is probable. As the 
world is on the path to globalization, the global south has not been left out. International 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
have had an increasing role in shaping the development trajectory of the global south. The IMF 
and WB are charged with the mission to reduce poverty and increase development through 
advising on economic policies and international investment, and generally overseeing the 
international economy.307
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The IMF and WB are “rhetorically committed” to the achievement of democratization 
and human rights in the state’s that they operate in, but their involvement in many of the state’s 
key affairs violate the achievement of these goals. In order to receive funds from these financial 
institutions, states must comply with certain conditions. These institutions often decide on state 
budgets, the value (and devaluation) of national currency, and the price of food and energy.308 In 
addition to denying democratic participation on issues that deeply effect the local economy,309 
many of the structural adjustment loans have conditions requiring “the cutting of public 
expenditure on health and education, labor market deregulation, export-oriented production, and 
privatization, [which] have led to increased income disparity, human rights abuses, and 
marginalization of the poor and rural populations in many countries.”310
According to Chossudovsky,  
 Here we can see that the 
power lies in the desires of the northern-backed international institutions, not the needs and 
realities of the state. 
The restructuring of the world economy under the guidance of the Washington-based 
international financial institutions increasingly denies individual developing countries the 
possibility of building a national economy: the internationalization of macro- economic policy 
transforms countries into open territories and national economies into 'reserves' of cheap labor 
and natural resources [for the benefit of the global north].311
 
 
In reality, these policies do not work towards ending poverty, put rather towards a “globalization 
of poverty.”312
International financial institutions, in cooperation with international corporations, have 
also influenced policy and advised funds for development projects that cause massive amounts of 
 These institutions are often portrayed as the leader of global economic 
liberalization, however in reality they are responsible for exacerbating existing conditions of 
poverty and conflict. The policies implemented also prevent governments from effectively 
honoring commitments to social welfare and as well as preventing a relationship of social 
responsibility through democracy between the state and citizens. These policies can have direct 
impact on further widening the divide between the global north and south and in creating 
environments in which migration is to likely result.  
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displacement. These projects are varied, and include dams, urban development, mining and 
mineral extraction, mega-events, and agri-business. There are no concrete numbers on many 
persons have been displaced by development projects. However, many experts estimate that in 
the past twenty years over 250 million people have been displaced in the name of 
development,313 reaching some 15 million people annually,314
These “forced resettlers,” as Turton calls them, are persons displaced in the name of the 
“national interest” to make way for a development project and have no option of ever returning 
‘home.’
 a number much larger than those 
fleeing war and conflict. 
315 The persons displaced in these projects are typically amongst the “poorest and 
politically most marginal members of a society” (subsistence farmers, indigenous groups, etc.) 
and are likely to become more vulnerable and fall further into poverty as a result of 
displacement.316 These persons are an example of victims of displacement that have no formal 
protection regime as they fall outside of the limited scope of international refugee law, and 
although internally displaced, they are not considered IDPs. Victims of development-induced 
displacement are potentially more vulnerable than IDPs, as there are limited organizations 
dedicated specifically to assisting those affected by these projects, and have few avenues for 
legal recourse.317
The most recent trend in foreign development projects is agricultural investment, or ‘land 
grabs.’
  
318 The Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that from 2007 to 2010, foreign 
investors acquired 20 million hectares of land in Africa alone, many times with leases of up to 99 
years;319
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policies.320
Many investments…failed to live up to expectations and, instead of generating sustainable 
benefits, contributed to asset loss and left local people worse off than they would have been 
without the investment. In fact, even though an effort was made to cover a wide spectrum of 
situations, case studies confirm that in many cases benefits were lower than anticipated or did not 
materialize at all.
 Many of these investments, and other similar projects, come with promises of local 
development, however these promise are rarely fulfilled. A report issued in September 2010 by 
the World Bank states that:  
321
 
 
This statement shows that these projects that are directly facilitated by international financial 
institutions are further exacerbating socio-economic issues in countries of the global south, and 
creating conditions of internal displacement and the potential to create conditions that have 
potential to create conflict.322
The mission to spread these values associated with globalization, namely democracy and 
neo-liberal economics has a similar connection to colonialism. Historically, the discourse of 
democracy was used to “announce, argue, and promote the cultural superiority of colonizing 
states” to justify their actions,
 
323 and also access foreign resources. In fact, the process of 
globalization, led by neo-liberal economics, has continued to reinforce a historical global power 
dynamic324 and threatens to “recolonize” the global south.325
Human Rights and Humanitarianism  
 
As the world has become more connected through globalization, so have the 
responsibilities for the causes of forced migration and displacement, as discussed above. 
However, the global north has effectively been able to refrain from taking responsibility for 
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displacement. The myth of difference discussed in Part II, has constructed the idea that the 
contemporary refugee flows in the global south are distinctly different from those of the past.326
 
 
This idea of this difference effectively consigns the blame of refugee production to the 
governments and societies of the global south. This is done through the use of human rights and 
humanitarianism, which not only removes the blame from the global north, but also maintains 
the current power dynamic between the global north and south.  
Refugees and the Human Rights Discourse  
As discussed in Part II, when forced displacement occurs between states in the global 
south “we are prepared to assume that they are refugees, or even that they should be considered 
as such despite not fitting within the letter of the law.” 327  Essentially, as long as they remain 
within the global south, northern states are not reluctant to acknowledge either their refugeehood 
or, in the case of IDPs, their inclusion under UNHCR’s mandate. The international refugee 
regime has become intertwined with the discourses of human rights and humanitarianism. One 
could even argue that the international refugee regime has become part of the larger international 
human rights law regime that functions to prevent, monitor and deter abuses. In this sense, the 
international refugee law regime provides surrogate protection for some human rights, if victims 
of abuse are able to cross international borders and seek protection328
Some believe that merging international refugee law with human rights law is the logical 
step towards a greater realization of human rights for displaced persons.
 However, the discourse of 
human rights, while it has benefits, also has inherently problematic aspects.  
329 There is a connection 
between refugee law and human rights law, as the right to asylum was first codified in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.330
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 However, rights are difficult to claim because 
refugees fall outside of the normative nation-state framework in which there is territory, 
government, citizens and non-citizens. The refugee does not fit in this framework, as they are 
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located within the “strange territory of estrangement” between a citizen and a foreigner.331 In 
other words, an in-between space in which one is not quite ‘human,’ in the sense that they are not 
entitled to rights and agency, or to have their actions and opinions hold significance.332
In some lines of thought, the 1951 Convention can be seen as an attempt to place the 
refugee, as a person who falls outside of the normative understanding of the state, back into the 
state system, to restore the individual as political subject and allowing them to access their “right 
to have rights.” As Arendt expresses “[w]e became aware of the existence of a right to have 
rights… and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of 
people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global 
political situation.”
  
333
The discourse of human rights is seductive as the language of human rights offers an 
ostensibly apolitical cure all for countries in the global south, a “mantra” that the north promotes 
in displacement-inducing and post-conflict societies.
 Although Arendt wrote under the context of World War II and the Cold 
War, this statement is still relevant. In a way, the refugee’s subjectivity is overshadowed by the 
citizen-state relationship that is essential to the current system of sovereign states; as non-citizens 
there is no direct accountability to any power to uphold their rights. This issue is particularly 
evident in the global north, where the increasing use of temporary protection further limits the 
displaced person’s access to rights, as discussed in Part II. 
334 Human rights hold promises of 
empowerment,335 and “give marginalized populations a universal language in which to present 
their particular demands as something more than subjectively felt grievances . . . a technique of 
articulation to which the rest of the world is bound, in principle, to listen.” 336
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Although human 
rights have the potential to offer this empowerment, it often fails to attend to the root causes of 
the displacement, as discussed above. When claims to human rights are made, “the systemic 
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context of abuses and vulnerabilities is largely removed from view” as human rights are often 
documented, but not explained.337
This lack of explanation is dangerous because without making an effort to understand the 
root causes of the problem, human rights really can only be a forum for grievances rather than an 
effort towards structural change. Thus, Douzinas states that “[i]t follows that as human rights 
become the lingua franca of the New Times but are unable to eliminate conflict, the formal 
struggle over human rights will revolve predominantly around their interpretation and 
application. As always, the universal is placed at the service of the particular: it is the prerogative 
of a particular to announce the universal.”
     
338
 
 The human rights discourse, while incredibly 
powerful in that most states are signatory to many of the conventions and laws, fail to have much 
influence on real change. In other words, the language of human rights have allowed the global 
north to remain largely un-attached from the root causes of refugee production, but as the 
abovementioned section suggested, this is not the reality. 
Humanitarianism 
The international refugee regime operates differently in the global north and in the global 
south. As discussed in Part II asylum procedures in the global north have merged with 
immigration, creating serious protection concerns. However, the reality is that most refugees and 
asylum seekers do not reach the territory of the global north, and this is not likely to change.  
Many authors advocate for expanding the definition of a refugee to be similar to the regional 
definitions utilized in Africa and Latin America in order to accommodate those fleeing 
generalized violence and civil strife.339
Even if the definition is expanded to include more persons and diverse forms of 
displacement, through the language of human rights or other inclusions, it does not touch at 
remedying the root causes of displacement or deal with the core issues of international refugee 
law. As international refugee law developed in a period where there was no accountability 
between the West and the existing (and defeated) totalitarian regimes, and thus “refugee law is 
 Although this would potentially be a positive step in 
protection, it is unlikely that the states of the global north will approve such a change, as they 
will not agree to an increase in the number of asylum claims they must accept.  
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not aimed at holding [refugee producing] states responsible, but rather its purpose is 
remedial.”340 The claim can be made that this is where human rights law’s role is important, as 
states are signatory to many conventions and treaties which in theory protect their citizens from 
the need to flee their state. However, the reality on the ground is that it is difficult to hold states 
accountable to these principles, as human rights and sovereignty are often clashing concepts.341
‘Humanitarian’ is defined generally as “concerned with or seeking to promote human 
welfare.”
 
Thus refugee law is aimed at ‘helping,’ not fixing the problem, and is increasingly being pushed 
to work exclusively under the banner of humanitarianism. 
342 The guidelines for humanitarian action that are most referenced are the seven 
fundamental principles created by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)343 in 
1965: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and 
universality.344 The ideals associated with humanitarianism and politics are usually 
conceptualized as clashing, so traditionally they have been kept as separate.345 In the battle to 
keep these ideas separate, the principles of impartiality and neutrality seem to recurrently 
become an issue. Generally speaking, this issue has created two camps of thought regarding 
humanitarianism: the ‘classicists,’ who are most aligned with the principles of the ICRC, which 
believe that humanitarian work can and should be completely separated from politics, and 
‘political humanitarians’ who believe that humanitarianism cannot and should not be separated 
from politics.346
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According to Chimni, who aligns with the ‘political humanitarians,’ the word 
‘humanitarianism’ is “omnifarious and lacks conceptual boundaries” as the term has not been 
defined explicitly in international law, and thus a wide range of acts are often considered or 
claimed to be ‘humanitarian.’ The ‘ideology’347 of humanitarianism is that “the human has the 
same needs, desires and traits everywhere and these (ought to) determine the rights we have.”348 
To be impartial and neutral (and thus humanitarian) implies “helping and protecting victims 
irrespective of who and where they are and why they are in need.” 349
Refugee protection is, in theory, premised on humanitarian principles, as the ‘problem’ of 
refugees is seen to be a humanitarian issue. The preamble to the 1951 Convention states that the 
Convention signifies that by signing this document, states are “recognizing the social and 
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent 
this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States,”
 
350 and the Statute of UNHCR 
states that “the work of the [UNHCR] is humanitarian and social and of an entirely non-political 
character.”351 In theory, then, international refugee law is founded on the principles of 
humanitarianism, not politics. Yet law is created and implemented by states that remain 
entrenched in politics.  This “ideology of humanitarianism” is something that, according to 
Chimni, belongs to hegemonic states (or states in the global north), which “mobilizes a range of 
meanings and practices to establish and sustain global relations of domination,” an ideology that 
is also “facilitating the erosion of the fundamental principles of refugee protection.”352
Humanitarianism has had a place in international politics largely since the creation of the 
ICRC in 1863, but today it holds a greater salience than in the past.
  
353
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the ‘”left hand of the empire [or global north]”354 and “overlaps with and contributes to the end 
of politics, instantiated by the unchallenged rule of world police and the rescue of ‘’victims.’”355
The Rwandan crisis has been presented by the western media as a profuse narrative of human 
suffering, while carefully neglecting to explain the underlying social and economic causes. The 
brutality of the massacres have shocked the world community, but what the international press 
failed to mention is that the civil war was preceded by the flare-up of a deep-seated economic 
crisis. It was the restructuring of the agricultural system which precipitated the population into 
abject poverty and destitution.
 
What is problematic with contemporary humanitarianism is that it seems to seek the protection 
of, or work towards, the realization of human rights, but it does so artificially and without 
attention to what we might call the “root causes” of human rights concerns. This is evidenced in 
the case of Rwanda, where Chossudovsky articulates this disconnect, which also links to the 
aforementioned issues associated with globalization and international financial institutions: 
356
 
 
As Douzinas explains, “post-communist humanitarianism, scared by the atrocities of 20th 
century ideology, prefers a suffering humanity and replaces the grand narratives of history with 
the misfortune of the species.”357
International refugee law consists of a large body of legally binding norms and principles, 
which are aimed at promoting asylum in foreign countries, and while others such as IDPs may 
receive protection, it is often more about humanitarian intervention in struggling countries than 
legal protections.
  In the above example from Rwanda, we can see that the 
‘humanitarian’ and ‘human rights’ discourses effectively placed blame in the structures of the 
state and region, not in the larger global dynamics. 
358
The refugee label, in both the global north and south, implies humanitarianism and 
“creates and imposes an institutional dependency,”
  However, refugee protection is moving more towards humanitarianism, 
rather than focus on legal rights, as most forced displacement is contained in the global south.  
359
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355 Ibid., 30. 
356 Chossudovsky, “Reforms and Social Unrest in Developing Countries,” 1788; see also this source for an 
in depth discussion of how the interference of the international financial intuitions, and subsequent socio-political 
issues, led to the deterioration of Rwanda, as well as in Somalia and Yugoslavia. 
357 Douzinas, “The Many Faces of Humanitarianism,” 20.  
358 Turton, “Refugees and ‘Other Forced Migrants,’” 4. 
359 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 37. 
65 
 
someone without agency, “whose dignity and worth have been violated, … powerless, helpless 
and innocent, [the victim’s] basic nature and needs have been denied” and that they are often 
conceptualized as “part of an indistinct mass or horde of disparaging, dispirited people,”360 and 
as victims of some evil, or perhaps human rights violations, in a sense they lose their 
humanity,361 what Giorgio Agamben refers to as “bare life.”362
In our globalized world, everything has been put into terms of exporting and importing, 
and cost and benefit. The global north not only exports financial and economic ideas into the 
global south, as mentioned above, but it also exports democracy and human rights.
   
363 In this line 
of thought, humanitarianism lies in a paradigm of the victim/ perpetrator/moral savior- a 
paradigm in which the countries of the north have delegated themselves as the moral savior and 
teacher, and the ‘Other’ as the victim and perpetrator.364 This stance effectively allows powerful 
(wealthy, democratic, and ‘rights-bearing’) societies to place the blame on other societies (in the 
global south) as the cause of human rights violations, without taking responsibility for their role 
in the creation of situations in which rights are not guaranteed or realized. According to 
Douzinas, “we [the global north] do not like these others [the suffering of the global south], but 
we love pitying them. They, the savages/victims, make us civilized.”365 In this humanitarianism, 
refugees are often cast as the hopeless victim, resulting in a power dynamic in which the global 
north provides humanitarian aid, “conceived of in terms of charity rather than as a means of 
enabling refugees to enjoy their rights.”366 This system, according to Chimni is part of the larger 
process of globalization, as it seeks “to legitimize and sustain an international system that 
tolerates an unbelievable divide not only between the north and the south but also inside 
them.”367
                                                             
360 Douzinas, “The Many Faces of Humanitarianism,” 11-12. 
  
361 Ibid., 12. 
362 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 45-67. 
363 Costas Douzinas, “The Many Faces of Humanitarianism,” 19.   
364Ibid. For Douzinas, in this context the ‘Other’ has two sides: one is the victim and the reverse side is the 
cause of the suffering, the absolute evil which can have many names, such as “the African dictator, the Slav torturer, 
the Balkan rapist, the Muslim butcher, the corrupt bureaucrat… the warlord, the rougue, the bandit” (to name a few). 
This side of the ‘Other’ is the “single cause and inescapable companion of suffering.” 
365 Ibid., 13. 
366 Barbara Harrell-Bond, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane,” Human Rights Quarterly 
24 (2002):53. 
367 Chimni, “Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection,” 245 
66 
 
However, perhaps it is necessary to maintain a victim-like definition in order for the 
concept of a ‘refugee’ to survive.368
An Irrational Construction 
 Would the north feel obligated to donate or assist if refugees 
or other victims of displacement had agency, if they were not portrayed as passive recipients of 
aid? Many refugees and forced migrants have been deeply affected by the process of 
globalization, one that creates a global divide that is increasingly more difficult to bridge.  
The previous analysis and information provided argues that international refuge law has 
lost its relevance as a protection mechanism in the contemporary realities of migration. 
Furthermore, the category of the ‘refugee’ has become an irrational distinction in international 
law. The continued use of the 1951 Convention has created and legitimated a normative 
understanding of the ‘refugee,’ including the causes of forced displacement worthy of this title 
and the associated international protection. This framework holds political persecution as the 
form of oppression that deserves protection and international response. The attention of the 
international community on the political refugee, or the Convention Refugee, has legitimated a 
system in which structural violence in the global south is largely tolerated. 
The domestic refugee systems in the countries of the global north have created a system 
in which this irrational distinction is to their advantage, allowing them to legally restrict entry of 
persons who do meet the Convention criteria.  Derrida’s conception of ‘hospitality’369 takes an 
interesting view in re-conceptualizing the restrictive policies towards refugees in the global 
north. For Derrida, the way in which states and societies accept foreigners (or ‘guests’) into their 
territory is framed around the notion of hospitality. The idea of ‘unconditional hospitality’ is 
being “open to someone who is neither expected not invited, to whomever arrives as an 
absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short wholly 
other.”370 The north is not unconditionally hospitable. They practice what Derrida terms 
‘tolerance,’ which is “scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance… and protecting of its 
sovereignty.”371
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369 For the complete work on ‘hospitality,’ see Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. Rachel Bowlby 
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When dealing with issues of displacement, this attitude of ‘tolerance’ is problematic as it 
is a conditional hospitality, or a hospitality without risk, in which he asks, can “a hospitality 
protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality?”372 One could 
argue that the right to asylum373 is the legal equivalent of such tolerance,374
If we first accept that refugees are “an inevitable if unintended consequence of the 
international states system,”
 a preventative 
measure to mitigate risk, and control and formalize the unexpected; the refugee or forced migrant 
represents the limits of hospitality.  
375
The consistent flows of forced migration that occur in the global south means that many 
of the receiving countries do not have much choice in regulating their ‘hospitality.’ And as 
forced displacement is dominated by internal displacement, how can a country practice this 
discretionary power over its own citizens? Or in other words, how do we conceptualize this 
relationship of tolerance, as the displaced become ‘guests’ in their own home?
 as citizens can no longer depend on their state for protection, one 
can see the irrationality of the refugee system, as it attempts to control what is in fact 
unexpected. However, as the causes of refugee production move away from clear individual 
persecution at the hands of the state, this framework for regulation becomes more problematic. 
Even this limited form of hospitality is waning as states in the north attempt to ensure that most 
asylum seekers do not reach this territory. Hospitality and tolerance become increasingly 
irrelevant as most forced migrants become contained under regional protection schemes in the 
global south.  
376 In the global 
south, tolerance has been replaced by humanitarianism. As discussed above, this humanitarian 
refugee regime as it stands today reinforces global discrimination. The answer to fighting this 
discrimination cannot be victimization.377
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absolute victim.”378
Then do we change the law? And if the legal definition of a refugee is made broader and 
more persons are included under this legal category, what would this change? If the definition 
were to be opened to meet the needs of all persons who are forced to migrate, in theory, whole 
countries could cross borders and become refugees. Broadening the definition does not remedy 
the root causes of forced migration, but rather creates a larger legal space to deal with them. The 
current state of protracted refugee and IDP situations
 To move away from the humanitarian approach would be a move towards 
relinquishing global control in all matters, including economic control and influence; a move that 
is not likely to happen. 
379
 For the millions of persons who are in these situations,
 is evidence that the expanded 
understanding of forced migration in the global south and the inclusion of more persons but has 
not changed the reality: people are fleeing and unable to return home.  
380 being a refugee, or a ward to 
the humanitarian global north, has become a way of life. Protracted refugee situations are not 
new, however they are becoming increasingly prevalent in part because of the prevalent 
situations of war and conflict which have made return difficult, but also the international 
community’s failure to bring them to an end.381
So what can be done to better this protection in a rational, reasonable way? A purely legal 
(often restrictive) approach, as is taken in much of the global north (discussed in Part II), 
removes the issues of morals and ethics, and protection becomes a purely “legal transaction” as 
  
                                                             
378 Agier, “Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects,” 33. 
379 There is no formal legal definition a protracted refugee situation, however it “refugees can be regarded 
as being in a protracted situation when they have lived in exile for more than five years, and when they still have no 
immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration, 
or resettlement.” The vast majority of these situations are found in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Jeff Crisp, “No Solutions 
in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa,” UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, 
Working Paper no. 75 (January 2003): 1, www.unhcr.org/3e2d66c34.  
380 According to the World Development Report 2011, There are upwards of 5.7 million refugees in 29 
situations constituting 54 % of the refugees under UNHCR protection and IDPs  in 35 situations comprising most of 
the IDPs  in protracted displacement situations at the time these numbers were taken, protracted situations existed 
when at least 25,000 persons of the same nationality were in exile; this numeric limit has since been removed, so the 
number of protracted situations is likely to be much larger. See Harild, Niels, and Asger Christensen. “The 
Development Challenge of Finding Durable Solutions For Refugees and Internally Displaced People.” World 
Development Report 2011 (July 30, 2011). http://wdronline.worldbank.org/ (accessed April 7, 2012). 
381 Crisp, “No Solutions in Sight,” 2; During the refugee produced from Cold War, as well as in Iraq, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor elicited a “decisive response from the world’s more prosperous states” which 
enabled a relatively quick process of repatriation or resettlement. However, most or the current situations of forced 
migration are not connected to a larger political goal or issue, so the pressure to ‘solve’ the problem and promote 
conditions enabling them to return home are simply not there. 
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states will do only what the law requires.382 On the other hand, a human rights-based or 
humanitarian approach, which is the main approach to problems in the global south, tends to 
remove the agency and autonomy of the individual.383 Finding a balance between the two is 
difficult. As stated before, human rights and state sovereignty tend to clash, as issues of 
emigration can be framed in terms of human rights, whereas the issue of immigration always 
remains a question of national sovereignty.384
Since the end of Cold War, and the end of the era of the ‘political refugee’ (or 
ideologically significant refugee), there has been an increasing effort to expand the 
conceptualization of this phenomenon, moving from focus on the ‘refugee’ to forced migration 
more generally. Some, most notably Hathaway, believe that refugee law is worth saving. For 
him, the “challenge is not to rewrite refugee law, but rather to take advantage of the flexibility 
which the extant body of law affords to retool it at an operation level”
 As the countries of emigration are predominantly 
located in the global south, a certain distinction is created: issues of human rights abuse lie in the 
south, while preserving sovereignty is the privilege of the north. 
385 and that refugee law 
must remain its focus on refugees as it plays a “truly unique human rights role at a time when no 
meaningful alternative is in sight.”386 To an extent this is true. At this point there are no 
alternatives in sight that acknowledge social realities, however, it is important that we realize that 
the law cannot be the sole mediator for this realization.387 Even if the field of ‘refugees’ is 
expanded to forced migration, we are simply bringing more persons, into the sphere of 
humanitarian protection, and further the conditions that allow forced migration to feed into the 
larger context of northern dominance.388
At this point, there are no meaningful alternatives in sight, because we are not actively 
seeking them from outside the confines of the 1951 Convention. Most of the current critiques try 
to re-conceptualize laws and policies with an emphasis on human rights or an increased space of 
protection. Additionally, the current political climate and the immigration stance of many of the 
   
                                                             
382 Erin K. Wilson, “Protecting the Unprotected: Reconceptualizing Refugee Protection through the Notion 
of Hospitality,” Local-Global Journal 8 (2010): 110. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 83. 
385 Hathaway, “Why Refugee Law Still Matters,” 97. 
386 Hathaway, “Why Refugee Law Still Matters,” 89; see also Hathaway, “Forced Migration Studies,” 349-
69. 
387 Chimni, “The Birth of a ‘Discipline,’” 24. 
388 Ibid., 11-29. 
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countries in the global north, who also fund most of UNHCR’s activities and programs, will not 
agree to a more inclusive legal framework.389 What is needed is a not a re-conception of the law, 
but rather a reform in how this space of protection is approached. The most realistic and relevant 
approach to reform, is the ‘Dialogic Model’ proposed by Chimni, as discussed in Part II. This 
model creates space for communication and discussion is opened which involves not only the 
governments and intuitions in the global south, but the refugees themselves.390 Similar to 
Chimni’s manifesto on Third World Approaches to International Law, this model confronts 
global inequalities, including the colonial logic of the global north’s humanitarian ideology.391
CONCLUSION 
 
Through challenging the current unilateral manner of decision making by UNHCR and the 
global north, and encouraging greater regional partnership among states of the global south, this 
model represents a step forward towards bridging the gap between the north and south and opens 
the potential for real progress to be made.  
 
International refugee law, as it stands today, legitimates a norm that is not beneficial to 
those suffering displacement and is not in tune with reality. Under this system asylum in both the 
north and south is no longer a legal, surrogate state protection. Instead, the refugee label has been 
draped in humanitarianism and victimization, which exacerbates the divide between the north 
and south and reaffirms the current global power dynamic as demonstrated in the process of 
globalization. However, this is not an issue restricted to refugee law, as the larger body of 
international law “is playing a crucial role in helping legitimize and sustain the unequal 
structures and processes that manifest themselves in the growing north-south divide.”392
As discussed earlier, the refugee holds an uncomfortable place in the international 
imaginary, as it does not fit into the normal framework of citizenship and states. This discomfort 
has led many to become specialists or experts in this field, as well as the emergence of refugee 
aid organizations, refugee lobby and advocacy groups, refugee lawyers, academic journals and 
 
                                                             
389 Edwards, “Human Rights, Refugees, and The Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum,” 329. 
390 Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee Regime.” 
391 See the following Chimni articles: “The Birth of a ‘Discipline,’” 24; Globalization, Humanitarianism 
and the Erosion of Refugee Protection,” 244; and “Third World Approaches to International Law,” 16. 
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university programs dedicated to refugee studies, further legitimizing and perpetuating this 
irrational distinction as an exceptional form of forced migration. The international refugee law 
regime’s lack of remedial action has continued to propagate a strategy that holds “prevention is 
preferable to cure.”393
The figure of the refugee helps shed light on some of the limits of international law, 
human rights and humanitarianism. The problem does not lie in the narrow definition of the 
refugee, but rather in the geopolitical structure of today’s world. If the inequalities and uneven 
development between the global north and south remain unchecked and continue grow, so will 
migration. In a recent news article titled ““Has the Refugee Convention Outlived Its 
Usefulness?” international refuge law expert Guy Goodwin-Gill stated: “The pure refugee does 
exist, but there are many others who face insecurity because of economic problems and 
persecution.”
 Through expanding humanitarian protection in the global south, the 
international community reaffirms the legitimacy of the law and ignores root cause of 
displacement that largely falls outside the 1951 Convention.  
394
 
 The political refugee defined in the 1951 Convention has indeed become largely 
extinct, and the uncritical acceptance of the current distinction of the ‘refugee’ as the exceptional 
forced migrant legitimates and perpetuates an unequal and irrational framework for protection. 
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